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To all those convicted under the doctrine of common purpose  















Swart gevaar was a term used during apartheid to refer to the perceived security threat of the 
majority black African population to the white South African government and the white 
minority population. The Native Territories Penal Code, transported from English law, 
assimilated the doctrine of common purpose into South African law. During apartheid, the 
doctrine of common purpose served as one of many governmental tools to criminalise the 
black population and curtail the swart gevaar. The development of the doctrine largely 
occurred during the apartheid-era, whereby the white-ruled judiciary continuously sacrificed 
legal principles to ensure that the doctrine achieved its’ crime control objective. The doctrine 
was expanded beyond its original scope in the Native Territories Penal Code to encompass 
two distinct forms of common purpose, namely: common purpose by prior agreement, 
whether by express or implied mandate; and common purpose in its active association form.  
In the 2003 case of Thebus and Another v The State, the Constitutional Court declared the 
doctrine of common purpose; in its active association form, constitutional. The Constitutional 
Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the doctrine infringes an accused’s 
constitutionally protected rights to dignity, freedom and security of persons, and a fair trial 
including the right to be presumed innocent. The Constitutional Court’s finding came as a 
surprise, as it ignored worldwide condemnation of the doctrine throughout the apartheid 
regime and Constitutional democratic era. This paper challenges the Constitutional Court’s 
finding and critically examines the doctrine of common purpose in the context of 
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The doctrine of common purpose is comprised of two distinct forms, namely: common 
purpose by prior agreement and common purpose in its active association form.
1
 The 
doctrine, in either form, does not require proof of a causal nexus between the participant’s 
conduct and the ultimate unlawful consequence.
2
 Instead, the participant’s conduct must 
establish a prior agreement to commit a crime or an active association with the unlawful 
conduct of the principal perpetrator(s), coupled with the requisite fault. In this event, the 
conduct of the principal perpetrator(s) who caused the ultimate unlawful consequence is 
imputed to the other participants to the common purpose.
3
 The participants are then regarded 




Common purpose by prior agreement arises out of an express or implied agreement between 
the participants before the commission of the crime.
5
 The agreement comprises the “group’s 
‘mandate’, which contemplates the objective of the group’s criminal endeavours”.
6
 If a prior 
agreement is established, it is not necessary that the accused participant be present at the 
scene where the crime was committed.
7
 Common purpose in its active association form 
covers the situation where there is an absence of proof of a prior agreement.
8
 However, 
before this form of common purpose can be applied, the requirements constituting an ‘active 
association’, otherwise known as the Mgedezi requirements, must be individually satisfied.
9
 
The requirements, as delineated by Botha JA in Mgedezi and confirmed by Moseneke J in 
Thebus, are as follows:
10
 
                                                          
1
 S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A) at 705-6; J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5
th
 Ed (2016) at 477; CR 
Snyman Criminal Law 6
th
 Ed (2014) at 260-1.  
2
 Thebus v S 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 22. 
3






 J Grant ‘Common Purpose: Thebus, Marikana and Unnecessary Evil’ (2014) 30 (1) SAJHR 1 at 3. 
7
 S v Majosi 1991 (2) SACR 532 (A); S v Mzwempi 2011 (2) SACR 237 (ECM) para 54; SV Hoctor ‘Criminal 
Law: Common Purpose’ (2011) Annual Survey of South African Law 336 at 348; S Hoctor ‘The state of 
common purpose liability in South Africa’ (2012) JCCL 180 at 184-5. 
8
 Thebus supra (n2) para 19. 
9
 Ibid para 20. 
10
 Mgedezi supra (n1) at 705I-706C. 
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i. Presence at the scene where the ultimate unlawful consequence was being committed; 
ii. Awareness of the ultimate unlawful consequence; 
iii. Intention to make common cause with those who were actually perpetrating the 
ultimate unlawful consequence;  
iv. Manifestation of a sharing of a common purpose with the perpetrators of the ultimate 
unlawful consequence by performing some act of association with the conduct of the 
others; and 
v. The requisite fault.11 
Common purpose may be applied in instances where the exact identity of the member of the 
common purpose who caused the consequence is unknown, provided that it is established that 
one of the group brought about the ultimate unlawful consequence.
12
 The prosecution would 
not have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each participant committed conduct that 
contributed causally to the ultimate unlawful consequence. The prosecution would merely 
have to establish that each participant either agreed to commit a particular crime or actively 




The doctrine of common purpose was utilised to secure convictions, coupled with the 
imposition of the death sentence in the cases of the Sharpeville Six,
14









 The judgments attracted 
significant criticism from the media and academics worldwide.
19
 Nevertheless, in the 2003 
case of Thebus, the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of common purpose 
                                                          
11
 Alkema J in Mzwempi supra (n7) para 72 submits that the “fifth requirement of mens rea is a definitional 
element of any crime which must in any event be proved, and is not a requirement of ‘active association’”. Fault 
may take the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus, dolus eventualis or negligence.  
12
 Burchell op cit (n1) at 477. 
13
 Thebus supra (n2) para 34.  
14
 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A). 
15
 S v Gqeba 1989 (3) 23 SA 217 (A).   
16
 S v Motaung 1990 (4) SA 485 (A).  
17
 S v Khumalo 1991 (4) SA 310 (A). 
18
 S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A).  
19
 MA Rabie ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose in Criminal Law’ (1971) 88 SALJ 227; E Cameron ‘Inferential 
reasoning and extenuation in the case of the Sharpeville Six’ (1988) 2 SACJ 243; VVW Duba ‘What was wrong 
with the Sharpeville Six decision?’ (1990) 2 SACJ 180; DS Koyana The Influence of The Transkei Penal Code 
on South African Criminal Law (1992) 20-44 (published doctoral thesis); MC Mare ‘The Doctrine of Common 
Purpose in South African Law’ in JJ Joubert Essays in honour of S.A Strauss (1995) 113-33; P Parker ‘South 
Africa and the Common Purpose Rule in Crowd Murders (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 78; E Cameron 
‘When Judges Fail Justice’ (2004) 121 SALJ 580; M Reddi ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose Receives the 
Stamp of Approval’ (2005) 122 SALJ 59; U Kistner ‘Common Purpose: The Crowd and the Public’ (2015) 26 
Law and Critique 27; Burchell op cit (n1) at 475-505. 
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in its active association form. The judgment received little criticism, until an attempt was 
later made to apply the doctrine to the events that unfolded in 2012, where 36 miners were 
killed by the South African Police Service in a labour dispute at Lonmin’s Marikana mine.
20
  
Burchell levels the foremost criticism against the doctrine.
21
 His arguments set up a basis for 
a critique and require more in-depth analysis. Upon further research, it became evident that 
academics had failed to provide a critical, holistic critique of common purpose, grounded in 
constitutional jurisprudence, criminal law principles, and policy considerations. 
 
ii. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
This thesis challenges the Constitutional Court’s finding in Thebus and critically examines 
the doctrine of common purpose in the context of constitutional jurisprudence, general 
principles of criminal law, and policy considerations.  
 
iii. OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides a digest of the 
development of common purpose in South Africa. The doctrine is traced from its origin in the 
Native Territories Penal Code to its eventual extension to two distinct forms of common 
purpose, namely: common purpose by prior agreement and common purpose in its active 
association form.  
The aim of Chapter Two is to present arguments declaring the entire doctrine 
unconstitutional. The chapter commences by detailing the Constitutional Court’s judgment in 
Thebus, whereby common purpose in its active association was deemed constitutional. 
Thereafter, the rights to dignity, presumption of innocence, freedom and security of person, 
and equality will be scrutinised to ascertain whether the doctrine infringes these rights. This 
chapter undertakes a limitation analysis, premised on the court’s adoption of a Kantian 
approach to the interpretation of rights.  
                                                          
20
 M De Waal ‘Apartheid and the Marikana murder charges: A common purpose indeed’ The Daily Maverick 31 
August 2012, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-08-31-apartheid-and-the-marikana-
murder-charges-a-common-purpose-indeed/#.WWYXKYiGPIU, accessed 15 July 2016. 
21
 Burchell op cit (n1) at 485-505. 
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Chapter Three articulates the relation between the principles of criminal law and the doctrine 
of common purpose. This chapter begins with a discussion of the doctrine’s adherence to the 
principle of legality. Thereafter, the court’s normative justification for the imputation of 
causation in common purpose by prior agreement and in its active association form is 
scrutinised. The chapter then details the problems associated with the assessment of fault in 
common purpose cases. It closes with an analysis of the effectiveness of the defences of 
mistake as to the causal sequence, and mistake of law to limit the liability under common 
purpose.  
Chapter Four details the three schools of thought related to the reformation of the doctrine of 
common purpose. Each school of thought is analysed against the constitutional and principled 
findings of this paper. This chapter presents the writers recommendation for reforming the 









A detailed historical development of the doctrine of common purpose will not be presented in 
this thesis, as numerous authors have provided a comprehensive historical account of the 
development of common purpose and its application in South Africa.
1
 Nevertheless, to 
provide the necessary context, this chapter will summarise the development of common 
purpose in South Africa.  
 
1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON PURPOSE 
The doctrine of common purpose, which was imported from England’s Native Territories 
Penal Code,
2
 afforded the apartheid government a means of controlling the perceived security 
threat of the majority black African population to the white South African government and 
the white minority population.
3
 Section 78 of the Act provides: 
If several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist 
each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one of them in 
the prosecution of such common purpose, the commission of which offence was, or ought to 
have been, known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of such common purpose.
4
 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of these historical accounts, see: MA Rabie ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose in Criminal 
Law’ (1971) 88 SALJ 227; MC Mare ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose in South African Law’ in JJ Joubert 
Essays in honour of S.A Strauss (1995) 113-33; P Parker ‘South Africa and the Common Purpose Rule in 
Crowd Murders (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 78; M Reddi ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose Receives 
the Stamp of Approval’ (2005) 122 SALJ 59; U Kistner ‘Common Purpose: The Crowd and the Public’ (2015) 
26 Law and Critique 27; CR Snyman Criminal Law 6
th
 Ed (2015) at 252-265; J Burchell Principles of Criminal 
Law 5
th
 Ed (2016) at 475-505.  
2
 Native Territories’ Penal Code Act 24 of 1886. 
3
 DS Koyana The Influence of The Transkei Penal Code on South African Criminal Law (1992) 20-44 
(published doctoral thesis, University of South Africa). 
4
 Section 5(e) of the Native Territories’ Penal Code expands on s 78.  
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The first citation of the common purpose rule was the 1917 case of McKenzie v Van der 
Merwe,
5
 where the Appellate Division (hereinafter AD) applied the rule in a civil case. Chief 
Justice Innes held that the common purpose rule is based upon implied mandate, meaning a 
mandate that is derived from the circumstances. Accordingly, Innes held that “the mere fact 
of being in a common purpose to rebel did not render the defendant liable for the acts of 
every other rebel unless the defendant had instigated or authorised those acts.
6
  
In the 1923 case of Garnsworthy,
7
 Judge Dove-Wilson applied the common purpose rule 
outside the scope of the Native Territories’ Penal Code. A group of miners at the Brakpan 
mine instigated an armed assault to shut down the operations of the mine. Seven people 
defending the mine were killed after surrendering, whilst one person was killed during the 
assault. There was no proof that any of the accused had killed any of the deceased. 
Nevertheless, the court found all of the accused guilty of murder on the basis of common 
purpose.  
In Garnsworthy, the court did not refer to McKenzie, wherein the issue of mandate was 
emphasised. The common purpose rule was often cited, but only as an alternative form of 
words to the phrase “aid, abet, counsel or procure.” Accordingly, the common purpose rule 
was interchangeable with the principles of complicity.
8
 Furthermore, the court ignored the 
issue of whether the doctrine necessitated a causal link between the accused’s act and the 
death of the eight miners defending the Brakpan mine. The court’s disregard of the causal 
requirement persisted in the majority of common purpose cases.
9
 
In 1945, the AD heard the first crowd common purpose case, Duma.
10
 The deceased, Mr 
Dhlative, was chased by a crowd of about 30 people and stabbed to death. Evidence at the 
trial court revealed that accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4, armed with sticks, were members of the 
attacking party. However, there was no evidence that the accused struck any blows. 
Nevertheless, the Natal High Court convicted accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of murdering Mr 
Dhlative. The accused then appealed on the facts to the AD. Tindall JA held:  
                                                          
5
 McKenzie v Van der Merwe 1917 AD 41.  
6
 Ibid at 46-47; Parker op cit (n1) at 82.  
7
 R v Garnsworthy 1923 WLD 17. 
8
 R v Ngcobo 1928 AD 372; R v Mbande 1933 AD 382; R v Longone 1938 AD 532; R v Matsiwane 1942 AD 
213; Parker op cit (n1) at 82-3.  
9
 MA Rabie op cit (n1) at 232-3; R v Shezi 1948 (3) SA 119 (AD); R v Mgxwiti 1954 (1) SA 370 (A); R v Nsele 
1955 (2) SA 145 (AD); R v Bergstedt 1955 (4) SA 186 (AD); R v Dladla 1962 (1) SA 307 (A); R v Macala 1962 
(3) SA 270 (A); S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (AD); S v Nkombani 1963 (4) SA 877 (AD); S v Bradbury 1967 
(1) SA 387 (AD); S v Williams 1970 (2) SA 645 (AD). 
10
 R v Duma 1945 AD 410; Parker op cit (n1) at 83. 
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Thus, though there was no previous agreement, there was concerted action among the persons 
with a common intention, namely, that of overtaking the deceased and beating him with 
sticks…
11
 The existence of a common illegal purpose may be inferred indirectly from the 
facts of a case.
12
 
Tindall JA attempted to construct a presumption of intent, whereby the means used to commit 
a crime would constitute sufficient evidence to convict anyone found with the same means to 
hand.
13
 Tindall JA’s judgment may have been a dissenting judgment, but it initiated two 
innovative formulations of the doctrine of common purpose.
14
 First, he held that the mandate 
of the common purpose could be implied. Secondly, proof of a previous conspiracy was not 
required. 
Tindall’s second formulation entailed two scenarios. First, an individual could spontaneously 
become a participant to an existing common purpose devoid of participation in the previous 
conspiracy.
15
 Secondly, a common purpose could exist without prior agreement, whereby a 
person acting with a common intent on an impulse is sufficient to constitute a common 
purpose.
16
 The AD favoured the second scenario.
17
  
Tindall’s dissenting judgment in Duma was partly rejected in Shezi.
18
 By this time, common 
purpose had already been extended beyond the scope of the Native Territories Penal Code. 
Greenberg JA’s judgment in Shezi sought to extend the liability net even further, holding that 
the means by which the result is produced is irrelevant, as liability depends on whether the 
act falls within the mandate.
19
 The judgment was declared incorrect by the AD in Goosen
20
 
only 42 years later.  
The doctrine continued to be developed to cover any lacunae that curtailed crime control. 
Noticeably, the interpretation of the doctrine at the time failed to address a major lacuna 
existing in instances where the liability of an individual who joined the common purpose 
                                                          
11
 Duma supra (n10) at 418. 
12
 Ibid at 418. 
13
 Ibid at 416-420; Parker op cit (n1) at 84. 
14
 Parker op cit (n1) at 85-6. 
15




Mkhize supra (n16) at 205-6; R v Ndhlangisa 1946 AD 1101; Shezi supra (n9) at 128; R v Mthembu 1950 (1) 
SA 670 (AD); Mgxwiti supra (n9) at 382; Bergstedt supra (n9) at 188; R v Motaung 1961 (2) SA 209 (AD) at 
210-11; S v Nkomo 1966 (1) SA 831 (AD) 833-4. 
18
 Shezi supra (n9). 
19
 Ibid at 128-30.  
20
 S v Goosen 1988 (4) SA 491 (AD). 
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while the victim was alive but only after the victim had been dealt the lethal blow was 
unclear. In Mgxwiti,
21
 an attempt was immediately made to fill this lacuna, whereby 
Schreiner JA revived the maligned theory of ratification.  
In Mgxwiti, the appellant contended that he could not be guilty of murder on the doctrine of 
common purpose, unless he associated himself with that purpose at a time when the deceased 
had not yet received a fatal injury.
22
 After interpreting the evidence, Schreiner JA noted that 
when the appellant reached the deceased, the deceased had already been mortally wounded. 
The appellant made common cause with the people responsible for the death of the deceased, 
but the common cause was made whilst the deceased was alive, yet after the cause of death 
had been committed. Schreiner JA’s interpretation of the evidence did not allow for a 
conviction of murder. In order to convict the appellant of murder, the basis of liability under 
common purpose had to be extended. Accordingly, Schreiner JA sacrificed legal principles 
and revived the theory of ratification, holding:  
I can see no objection, however, to according, in this narrow field, recognition to the principle 
of ratification– that whoever joins in a murderous assault upon a person must be taken to have 
ratified the infliction of any injuries which have already been inflicted, whether or not in the 
result these turn out to be fatal either individually or taken together.
23
 
As early as 1925, Kotze J admonished the theory of ratification.
24
 Nevertheless, Schreiner JA 
revived the theory of ratification due to its “practical advantages” of securing convictions.
25
  
Schreiner JA’s theory of ratification was later endorsed by the majority of the Rhodesian 
Federal Court in Chenjere
26
 and the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in 
Mneke.
27
 The unanimous judgment in Thomo,
28
 per Wessels JA, rejected the theory of 
ratification, holding “the rule is contrary to accepted principle and authority. Even if it were 
open to this court to give its approval to the rule of law referred to in Mgxwiti’s case, I am 
satisfied that no good reason exists why it should do so”.
29
  
                                                          
21
 Mgxwiti supra (n9). 
22




 R v Mlooi 1925 AD 131 at 152. 
25
 Mgxwiti supra (n9) at 383A-B. 
26
 R v Chenjere 1960 (1) SA 473 (FC) 476E-477A and 481E-H. 
27
 R v Mneke 1961 (2) SA 240 (N) 243H-244A. 
28
 R v Thomo 1969 (1) SA 385 (A). 
29
 Ibid at 399H and 400C. 
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In 1982, the theory of ratification received attention in Khoza,
30
 whereby Corbett JA’s 
judgment affirmed the theory’s rejection. However, Botha AJA’s dissenting judgment 
supported the theory of ratification, holding that the theory “is a pragmatic one which I 
consider to be soundly based on considerations of policy and practical exigency in the 
administration of criminal justice”.
31
 Botha AJA’s approach was later followed by Thirion J 
in Dlamini,
32
 who endorsed the need for a pragmatic approach in such cases.
33
 The theory of 
ratification was finally rejected in 1990 in Motaung,
34
 whereby Hoexter JA declared the 
element of retrospectivity alien to our principles of criminal responsibility.
35
  
The importance of the Khoza judgment pertained to the dissenting judgment of Botha AJA, 
wherein he introduced the notion of ‘active association’. Botha AJA did not apply the theory 
of ratification to create liability, and instead, opted for an even greater danger to legal 
principles. He discussed the necessity of a causal nexus, noting that in the cases of Mgxwiti 
and Dlaldla, criminal liability ensued despite the lack of proof that the accused contributed 
causally to the death of the deceased.
36
 Botha AJA held that the actus reus of the accused 
consists “not in an act which is causally linked with the death of the deceased, but solely in 
an act by which he associates himself with the common purpose to kill.
37
 It is sufficient to 
found the appellant’s liability simply on his active association with accused No. 2’s 
murderous assault on the deceased”.
38
  
Botha AJA failed to delineate the concept of association. Snyman appropriately condemned 
Botha AJA’s judgment, reasoning that the departure from a causal nexus effectively 
redefined the common law crime of murder.
39
 Furthermore, Snyman equated the concept of 
active association with the theory of ratification, holding that “an adoption of the former must 
necessarily lead to an application of the latter – something which would be completely 
foreign to the principles of our law”.
40
 Botha AJA’s judgment in Khoza was the minority 
                                                          
30
 S v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A). 
31
 Ibid at 1049H. 
32
 S v Dlamini 1984 (3) SA 360 (N). 
33
 Ibid at 367B-D. 
34
 S v Motaung 1990 (4) SA 485 (A). 
35
 Khoza supra (n31) at 521B-C. 
36
 Ibid at 1052D. 
37
 Ibid at 1052F-G. 
38
 Ibid at 1053H. 
39
 CR Snyman Criminal Law 1
st





judgment, but this formed the basis of his later judgment in Safatsa.
41
 
Botha JA utilised the factual scenario of Safatsa to affirm his dissenting judgment in Khoza. 
The AD, per Botha JA, held that proof that the six accused contributed causally to the death 
of the deputy mayor was not required, instead the accused could be found guilty on their 
active association in the common purpose.
42
 The concept of active association, despite its 
introduction six years earlier in Khoza, remained undefined. Nevertheless, Botha JA justified 
common purpose on the basis of “a lot of common sense and expediency”.
43
 Furthermore, he 
attempted to dismiss the earlier criticism against the doctrine, asserting “what is more 
important is that the authors who are critical of the practice of the courts do not appear to 
have problems with the actual results achieved in the vast majority of cases”.
44
 
The judgment in Safatsa received worldwide opprobrium. Justice Edwin Cameron later 
criticised the judgment, holding that it was as “an outrageous curvature of the laws of logic 
and fairness– a miscarriage of justice symptomatic of the extremities apartheid was inflicting 
on the legal system”.
45
 The London Times described the six accused as “victims of legal 
chicanery”, concluding that “such a judicial system hardly deserves the name. It is little more 
than a charade designed to deter and intimidate – terror tailored to the purposes of the 
State”.
46
 The criticism against the Safatsa judgment was chiefly due to the application of the 
factual matrix to the undefined concept of active association.
47
 In an attempt to salvage South 
Africa’s judiciary from the global onslaught of criticism, Botha JA attempted to develop the 
concept of active association in Mgedezi.
48
  
Botha JA infused his earlier innovation of the concept of active association with Whiting’s 
approach,
49
 resulting in the birth of what is presently known as the Mgedezi requirements.
50
 





                                                          
41
 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A); Parker op cit (n1) at 96-9. 
42
 Safatsa supra (n41) at 894G. 
43
 Ibid at 899H. 
44
 Ibid at 901A-B. 
45
 E Cameron ‘When Judges Fail Justice’ (2004) 121 SALJ 580. 
46
 The Times, 16 March 1988; Parker op cit (n1) at 98-9. 
47
 E Cameron ‘Inferential reasoning and extenuation in the case of the Sharpeville Six’ (1988) 2 SACJ 243; 
VVW Duba ‘What was wrong with the Sharpeville Six decision?’ (1990) 2 SACJ 180. 
48
 S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A). 
49
 R Whiting ‘Joining in’ (1986) 103 SALJ 38.  
50
 The Mgedezi requirements are detailed in the preface (page 2).  
51
 S v Yelani 1989 (2) SA 43 (A). 
52





 served as a limitation to the widely accrued liability under common purpose. 
However, the limitation bore no practical effect, as the court’s application of the factual 
matrix to the Mgedezi requirements evinced the judiciary’s freedom to interpret a case with 
hindsight directed at crime control. The submission is affirmed by the infamous case of 
Nzo,
54
 wherein counsel for the appellants argued that the doctrine of common purpose should 
not be used to hold members of a large organisation, the ANC, liable for crimes committed 
by other members with which individual members had not associated themselves.
55
  
Steyn JA in Nzo supported the contention, asserting that an “overarching common purpose to 
commit sabotage is insufficient to warrant liability for murder”.
56
 Nevertheless, the AD, per 
Hefer JA, held that “their design was to wage a localised campaign of terror and destruction; 
and it was in the furtherance of this design and for the preservation of the unit and the 
protection of each of its members that the murder was committed”.
57
 Furthermore, Hefer JA 
asserted that “there is no logical distinction between a common design relating to a particular 
offence and one relating to a series of offences”.
58
 Burchell submits that Hefer JA’s judgment 
was another attempt to extend the scope of the doctrine of common purpose, as the court’s 
application of the facts in Nzo did not satisfy the necessary Mgedezi requirements.
59
  
The courts evinced a proclivity to sacrifice legal principles and apply the doctrine correctly 
where crime control was the central theme. Manifestly, on a number of occasions, the AD 
had to correct the trial court’s application of the doctrine, as the guilt of the accused, 
specifically the existence of a common purpose and the requisite fault element was assessed 
on a generalised basis as opposed to the legally accepted norm of individually assessed 
guilt.
60
 The case of Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg
61
 was the first case wherein the doctrine 
of common purpose was applied against the State, thus marking a noteworthy exception to 
the State’s intended purpose of an oppressive law.  
In Magmoed, the South African Police and South African Railway Police responded to a 
                                                          
53
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threat of civil unrest in the Athlone area.
62
 Ten officers, armed with shotguns drove in a truck 
down Thornton Road. The officers fired a number of shots in the direction of persons 
gathered in groups, resulting in three persons being killed and wounding at least 15 others. 
The trial court acquitted all the officers of both charges.
63
 The appellant, dissatisfied with the 
trial court’s judgment, applied for the reservation of certain questions of law for the 
consideration of the AD.
64
 The application was rejected by the trial court. The appellant then 
applied directly to the AD.
65
  
The AD rejected the application, reasoning that the trial court was correct in holding that the 
appellant’s question, regarding whether the trial court was correct in concluding that no 
common purpose in both forms existed, was an attempt to frame a matter of fact as a matter 
of law. However, the AD, per Corbett CJ, intimated that “there are strong indications of a 
common purpose on the part of the Accused to act illegally”.
66
 The question then arises as to 
the reason why the trial court found that no such common purpose existed. The trial court 
concluded that despite the strong evidence in favor of the existence of a common purpose, 
there was no common purpose by prior agreement.
67
 
However, the trial court, per Williamson J, did admit that “it is quite correct that in my 
judgment I did not specifically and in so many words deal with whether or not a spontaneous 
on the spur of the moment association to commit illegal acts was formed. Perhaps I should 
have”.
68
 It is submitted that had the trial court applied the factual matrix to common purpose 
by active association, the accused policemen would have been found guilty of murder. The 
submission is supported by the AD’s interpretation of the admitted evidence.
69
  
The development of common purpose thrived under the apartheid-ruled judiciary. Legal 
principles were ungrudgingly sacrificed to protect White South Africa regarding the Swart 
Gevaar. The rise of the African National Congress and the introduction of a constitution that 
sought to guarantee everyone a number of rights non-existent during apartheid, suggested the 
demise of laws that were inherently utilised to criminalise black people. This was not to be.   
                                                          
62
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68
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69
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The Constitutional dispensation marked a vital change to South Africa’s legal and civil 
culture. The Bill of Rights guaranteed a number of important rights to everyone, thus 
providing a laudable bulwark against the oppressive laws of the apartheid regime. The 
survival of the doctrine of common purpose, grounded as an oppressive law applied by the 
apartheid government, seemed implausible against an individual’s constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. Burchell submitted that “the common-purpose rule in South Africa might not survive 
such a constitutional challenge”, as an accused’s right to equality and presumption of 
innocence is unjustifiably limited.
70
  
The extension of the doctrine and its controversial effects continued after the promulgation of 
the final Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter SCA) in 
Khambule
71
 was another instance where the scope of the doctrine of common purpose was 
extended in an effort to control crime. The court extended common purpose to apply to 
charges of possession of a firearm, holding that it was sufficient if the participants associated 
themselves with the possession of the firearms.
72
 The judgment in Khambule survived for two 
years, until the SCA in Mbuli
73
 held that a “contravention does not arise from an application 
of the principles applicable to common purpose, but rather from an application of ordinary 
principles relating to joint possession.”
74
   
In the 2003 case of Thebus,
75
 the constitutionality of common purpose was finally 
scrutinised. The Constitutional Court (hereinafter CC) assessed the appellants’ claim as to 
whether the SCA failed to comply with its duty in terms of s 39(2) of the Constitution to 
develop and apply the common law doctrine of common purpose so as to bring it in line with 
the constitutional rights to dignity, freedom and security of the person and the right to be 
presumed innocent. The CC rejected the appellants’ arguments, and constitutionally endorsed 
common purpose in its active association form.
76
 Moseneke J expressed the doctrine as 
follows: 
Where two or more people agree to commit a crime or actively associate in a joint unlawful 
enterprise, each will be responsible for specific criminal conduct committed by one of their 
                                                          
70
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number which falls within their common design. Liability arises from their ‘common 
purpose’ to commit the crime.
77
 
The most controversial effect of common purpose, which was entirely ignored by the CC in 
Thebus nearly 10 years earlier, came to light in the aftermath of the notorious Marikana 
Massacre.   
On 30 August 2012, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) charged 270 miners in the 
Ga-Rankuwa Magistrate’s Court with the murder of 34 of their mining comrades, who were 
shot and killed by police at Lonmin’s platinum mine in Marikana.
78
 Additionally, the 270 
miners had been charged with attempted murder for the injuries inflicted by the police on 78 
miners.
79
 The decision to charge the miners was later withdrawn and suspended.
80
 The NPA’s 
decision to prosecute the miners was met with fervent condemnation from legal academics 
extending to society at large.
81
 Devenish asserts that the decision to prosecute is “indeed an 
unprecedented, irrational and distorted application of the doctrine and will undoubtedly taint 
the NPA with notoriety internationally. Even during the long and very painful apartheid era 
involving serious civil commotion spanning more than four decades, was such a farcical 
criminal ruse ever devised”.
82
 Similarly, De Vos submits that the decision is “bizarre and 
shocking and represents a flagrant abuse of the criminal justice system, most probably in an 
effort to protect the police and/or politicians”.
83
 However, the NPA’s decision to charge the 
270 miners, although unprecedented, irrational, bizarre and shocking, is consistent with the 
objective of the doctrine of common purpose. The doctrine infringes a number of 
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 and erodes established principles of criminal law,
85
 thus the potential 
for abuse exists, as clearly demonstrated in the Marikana situation. 
 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of common purpose has evolved significantly in South Africa since its inception 
from English law. Common purpose has been extended beyond the scope of the Native 
Territories Penal Code, recognising an implied mandate as sufficient to found a common 
purpose. A further extension pertained to the new form of common purpose, active 
association, which the CC constitutionally endorsed. The ensuing chapter begins by detailing 
the CC’s judgment in Thebus. Thereafter, arguments challenging the constitutionality of the 
doctrine of common purpose in South Africa will be presented. 
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A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON 




Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are 
presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence 
cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, 
called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core 
belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit in 
with the core belief.
1
 
The Constitutional Court’s endorsement of the doctrine of common purpose in Thebus and 
Another v The State
2
 has espoused a guarantee of an accused’s constitutionally protected 
rights to dignity, freedom and security of persons, and a fair trial including the right to be 
presumed innocent. This chapter begins by elucidating the judgment in Thebus, whereby the 
Constitutional Court (hereinafter CC) had to determine whether the doctrine had to be 
developed and applied so as to bring it in line with the aforementioned constitutional rights. 
Thereafter, heeding Moseneke J’s expression that “the appellants stopped short of asserting 
that the doctrine of common purpose is unconstitutional in its entirety”,
3
 arguments declaring 
the entire doctrine unconstitutional will be presented. This chapter presents arguments 
detailing the potential infringements of an accused’s right to dignity, presumption of 
innocence, freedom and security of person, and equality. A limitation analysis is undertaken, 
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2.2 THEBUS AND ANOTHER V THE STATE: A SUMMARY 
 
2.2.1 The facts  
 
In 1998, residents of Ocean View formed a group, which included Thebus (First Appellant) 
and Adams (Second Appellant), to protest against drug dealers in the area.
4
 The protesting 
group drove through Ocean View in a motorcade. As the motorcade approached the house of 
Cronje, a drug dealer in the area, Cronje fired a number of gunshots on the protesting group. 
The protesting group retaliated with gunfire. As a result, a seven-year-old girl was killed in 
the cross-fire. Furthermore, two males were wounded in the cross-fire.
5
 Both appellants were 
arrested on suspicion of having been part of the group.  
In 2000, the appellants were brought to trial.
6
 Kiel, a state witness, testified that he saw the 
first appellant near a vehicle holding a pick-axe handle.
7
 Furthermore, Kiel testified to seeing 
the second appellant holding an apparently unused firearm and also retrieving spent 
cartridges of other protestors.
8
 The Cape High Court accepted the State’s evidence that 
proved the appellants’ presence at the scene of the shooting. Accordingly, the trial court 
rejected the appellants’ alibi defences, which were not disclosed before the trial. Mitchell AJ 
applied the doctrine of common purpose to convict the appellants on one count of murder and 
two counts of attempted murder.
9
 The appellants were granted leave to appeal against their 
convictions. In 2002, the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter SCA) (per 
Lewis AJA and Olivier JA concurring) upheld the trial court’s findings and dismissed the 
appellants’ appeal.
10
 Subsequently, the appellants made an application for special leave to 
appeal to the CC against the judgment and order of the SCA.  
2.2.2 The legal issues 
The CC granted leave to appeal. The appellants raised two issues: (1) whether the SCA failed 
to comply with its duty in terms of s 39(2) of the Constitution to develop and apply the 
common law doctrine of common purpose so as to bring it in line with the constitutional 
                                                          
4
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5
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rights to dignity, freedom and security of the person and the right to be presumed innocent; 
and (2) whether the SCA erred in drawing a negative inference from the first appellant’s 




2.2.3 The Constitutional Court’s judgment    
The CC, per Moseneke J, defined the doctrine of common purpose as “a set of rules of the 
common law that regulates the attribution of criminal liability to a person who undertakes 
jointly with another person or persons the commission of a crime”.
12





 articulations on the definition of common purpose.
15
 The CC 
affirmed the judgment in Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg, whereby the Appellate Division 
articulated that a “common purpose may arise by prior agreement between the participants or 
it may arise upon an impulse without prior consultation or agreement”.
16
 The CC held that the 
present matter was devoid of any prior agreement.
17
 Accordingly, the CC clarified the trial 
courts reliance on the judgment in Mgedezi,
18
 wherein the requirements for common purpose 
by active association were expounded.
19
 
The appellants’ argued that the judgment in Mgedezi, specifically the requirements of active 
association, should have been developed in accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution, and 
if this had been done, the appellants would have been entitled to an acquittal.
20
 The appellants 
contended that the High Court and the SCA failed to develop, apply and elucidate the 
following requirements:  
i. there must be a causal connection between the actions of the appellants and the crime 
for which they were convicted;  
                                                          
11
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ii. the appellants must have actively associated themselves with the unlawful conduct of 
those who actually committed the crime; and  




The CC noted that the appellants failed to challenge the constitutionality of the doctrine of 
common purpose in its entirety.
22
 
The CC relied on the two-stage enquiry expounded in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security to interrogate the appellant’s arguments.
23
 Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires 
that when a court develops the common law it must promote the spirit, purpose and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. Moseneke J explicated two instances where the need to develop the 
common law under s 39(2) could arise. The first instance is where a rule of the common law 
is inconsistent with a constitutional provision, thus compelling an adaptation of the common 
law to resolve the inconsistency.
24
 A constitutional challenge in this instance requires the 
two-part test for constitutional validity delineated by Kriegler J in In Re S v Walters.
25
 The 
second instance is where a rule of the common law is not inconsistent with a specific 
constitutional provision but falls short of its spirit, purpose and objects, thus requiring 
adaptation so that it grows in harmony with the “objective normative value system” found in 
the Constitution.
26
 In view of the above, the CC assessed the appellants’ arguments.  
The appellants urged the CC to develop the doctrine by requiring proof that the conduct of 
the participant to the common purpose factually and legally caused or contributed to the 
ultimate unlawful consequence.
27
 However, the CC proclaimed that the Mgedezi principles 
were not directly challenged by the appellants.
28
 The CC asserted the rule that a causal 
connection between the conduct of each participant in the crime and the unlawful 
consequence caused by one or more in the group is not a requirement to establish criminal 
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 Furthermore, the CC cited identical causal nexus rules in many other common law 
jurisdictions, such as England, Canada, Australia, Scotland and America.
30
  
The CC confirmed that an accused participant would be guilty of the offence if the accused 
had the required intention in respect of the unlawful consequence and actively associated 
with the conduct of the perpetrators in the group that caused the offence.
31
 In effect, the 
doctrine of common purpose dispenses with the prerequisite for a causal connection between 
the accused’s conduct and the unlawful consequence, which is ordinarily a prerequisite for 
criminal liability in a consequence crime.
32
 The CC justified dispensing with a causal nexus 
on the basis of society’s interest in crime control thus: 
The principal object of the doctrine of common purpose is to criminalise collective criminal 
conduct and thus to satisfy the social “need to control crime committed in the course of joint 
enterprises”. The phenomenon of serious crimes committed by collective individuals, acting 
in concert, remains a significant societal scourge. In consequence crimes such as murder, 
robbery, malicious damage to property and arson, it is often difficult to prove that the act of 
each person or of a particular person in the group contributed causally to the criminal result. 
Such a causal prerequisite for liability would render nugatory and ineffectual the object of the 




The appellants made four submissions in support of their legal issue. First, the appellants 
submitted that the doctrine of common purpose violated their dignity, as they were deprived 
of their individuality by treating them “in a general manner as nameless, faceless parts of a 
group”.
34
 Furthermore, the appellants argued that an accused charged with murder, as 
opposed to an alternative charge or competent verdict, severely taints an individual’s 
dignity.
35
 Moseneke J disagreed with the appellants reasoning, holding that “it is fallacious to 
argue that the prosecution and conviction of a person de-humanises him or her and thus 
invades the claimed rights”.
36
  




 Ibid; Moseneke J is correct in holding that these common law jurisdictions do not require a causal link 
between the participant’s act and the ultimate unlawful consequence. However, he ignores the fact that common 
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34




 Ibid para 36.  
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The appellants’ second submission related to their right to freedom and security of person. 
The appellants argued that the doctrine’s dispensing of the causal connection requirement 
amounted to a violation of their right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily, as “this mode 
of criminal liability countenances the most tenuous link between individual conduct and the 
resultant liability”.
37
 Moseneke J held that the appellants’ constitutional complaint must be 
directed at the criminal norm in issue, specifically, the standard of criminal culpability 
required under the doctrine may not unjustifiably limit any Constitutional rights.
38
 Moreover, 
Moseneke J held that the prerequisite of a causal connection is not a definitional element of 
all crimes; hence the doctrine’s dispensing of the requirement does not render the criminal 
norm constitutionally impermissible.
39
 Moseneke J concluded his reasoning by justifying 
potential violations of freedom and security of persons on the rationally connected legitimate 
objective of limiting and controlling joint criminal enterprise: 
It serves vital purposes in our criminal justice system. Absent the rule of common purpose, all 
but actual perpetrators of a crime and their accomplices will be beyond the reach of our 




The third submission entailed the CC evaluating the appellants’ claim that their conviction 
under the doctrine of common purpose negated their right to be presumed innocent. Section 
35(3)(h) of the Constitution provides that every accused has the right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right to be presumed innocent. Accordingly, the appellants contended that the 
doctrine, through dispensing with the causal connection requirement, violated their right to be 
presumed innocent.
41
 The CC’s endorsement of the doctrine dispensing with the causal 
requirement led Moseneke J to hold: 
The doctrine neither places an onus upon the accused, nor does it presume his guilt. The state 




The appellants’ final submission raised two criticisms leveled by Burchell and Milton:  
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a. The requirement of active association has been cast too widely or misapplied.  
b. There are less invasive forms of criminal liability than convicting a participant in a 
common purpose as a principal.
43
  
On the first criticism, Moseneke J held that the criticism did not render the liability 
requirement of active association unconstitutional, but reinforced the trial court’s obligation 
“when applying the doctrine of common purpose, to exercise the utmost circumspection in 
evaluating the evidence against each accused person. The trial court must ascertain, with 
regard to each accused person in each case, the location, time, sequence, duration, frequency 
and nature of the conduct alleged to constitute sufficient participation or active association 
and its relationship, if any, to the criminal result and to all other prerequisites of guilt”.
44
  
On the second criticism, as Moseneke J found no violation of the contested rights, the CC 
omitted the proportionality assessment between the extent of the doctrine’s violation of 
constitutional rights and society’s need and right to suppress criminal conduct.
45
 In 
conclusion, Moseneke J held: 
Despite the evocative history of the application of the doctrine of common purpose in 
political and other group prosecutions, I am of the view that the common law doctrine of 
common purpose in murder as set out in S v Mgedezi and cases considered in this judgment,
 
does pass constitutional muster and does not, in the context of this case, require to be 
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2.3 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CHALLENGED CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 
 
A person who knowingly, and bearing the requisite intention, 
participates in the achievement of a criminal outcome cannot, 
upon conviction in a fair trial, validly claim that his or her 
rights to dignity and freedom have been invaded.
47
 
For the remainder of this chapter, where reference is made to the doctrine of common 
purpose, it includes both the prior agreement and active association form of common 
purpose, unless otherwise stated.  
The right to dignity forms the foundational value of the rights infringed by the application of 
common purpose. The right to dignity, in a criminal law context, which encompasses the 
principles of culpability, proportionality, and fair labeling, gives much needed content to the 
relevant limited argument leveled by the appellants in Thebus.
48
 It will be argued that the 
doctrine fails to satisfy the three principles rooted in the right to dignity, thus potentially 
amounting to an infringement of the right.  
The argument will expand on the appellants’ assertion that the doctrine infringed their right to 
be presumed innocent, by considering the content of the presumption of innocence. This will 
reveal that the right will be infringed when a necessary element of a crime is not established 
and an accused is not afforded viable defences.
49
  
Moseneke J’s adherence to the precedent set in De Lange v Smuts,
50
 regarding the threshold 
test for an alleged violation of the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without 
just cause will be scrutinised. A proper application of the threshold test posits the 
infringement of an accused’s right to freedom and security of person.  
An additional constitutional criticism levelled against the doctrine is presented by Burchell, 
whereby he introduces a participant’s potential claim for unfair discrimination.
51
 The distinct 
treatment of certain parties under the application of common purpose warrants investigation. 
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Thus, the Harksen test is presented, which postulates the unfair discrimination of participants 
to a common purpose.  
In conclusion, a limitation analysis is presented, with reference to the court’s adoption of a 
Kantian approach to the interpretation of the limitation of rights. The interpretative approach 






















2.4 THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY AND THE THREE COROLLARY PRINCIPLES  
 
2.4.1 The nature and scope 
In Thebus, the appellants contended that the doctrine of common purpose “undermines the 
fundamental dignity of each person convicted of the same crime with others because it de-
individualises him or her. It de-humanises people by treating them, ‘in a general manner as 
nameless, faceless parts of a group’”.
52
 Furthermore, the appellants argued that common 
purpose violates their dignity, as its application results in the conviction of a crime like 




An elucidation of the nature and scope of the right to dignity, in a criminal law context, 
reveals three corollary principles, namely the principle of culpability; the principle of 
proportionality; and the principle of fair labeling.
54
 The three principles, rooted in the right to 
dignity, gives content to the appellants’ aforementioned constitutionality contention in 
Thebus. A violation of a principle results in an individual’s right to dignity being infringed. 
This chapter assesses the appellants’ claim that the doctrine infringes an accused’s right to 
dignity by scrutinising the doctrine’s adherence to the three corollary principles.
55
  
The right to human dignity is considered the most important right in the Constitution, as 
dignity is the foundation of all rights in the Constitution.
56
 Section 10 of the Constitution 
provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.
57
 Human dignity, as expressed in Roman-Dutch Law, was synonymous with self-
                                                          
52




 SA Walker A Critical Evaluation of the Doctrine of Common Purpose in South African Law (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2013) at 127; M Kremnitzer & T Hörnle ‘Human Dignity and the 
Principle of Culpability’ (2011) 44 Israel LR 115.   
55
 Walker op cit (n54) at 123-41.  
56
 The Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (‘the 1996 Constitution’); S v 
Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); D Davis, H Cheadle and N Haysom Fundamental Rights in the 
Constitution: Commentary and cases (1997) at 70; A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of 
Our Constitutional Order’ (2002) 16 SAJHR 193; N Goolam ‘Human dignity-our supreme constitutional value’ 
(2001) 4 Potchefstroom Electronic Review 52; L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South 
Africa (2012); S Woolman  ‘The Architecture of Dignity’ in D Cornell, S Woolman et al (eds) The Dignity 
Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013); D Schultziner & GE Carmi ‘“Dignitizing” Constitutions 
Worldwide: On the Proliferation of Human Dignity in National Constitutions’ (2013), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/guy_carmi/6, accessed on 25 August 2016.   
57





 Furthermore, the AD has likened human dignity with status, honour and 
reputation.
59
 Kant describes human dignity as the characteristic that gives a person intrinsic 
worth, which is related to both the individual and the community.
60
  
Similarly, the CC has asserted the protection of dignity based on the acknowledgment of the 
value and worth of all individuals as members of our society.
61
 The CC construes dignity as 
“an entitlement of human beings to be treated as worthy of respect and concern”.
62
 In Dodo, 
Ackermann J highlighted the importance of dignity by asserting “human beings are creatures 
with inherent and infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely 
as a means to an end”.
63
 In Ferreira v Levin, Vryenhoek v Powell,
64
 Mokgoro J expressed 
dignity as encompassing Ubuntu, whereby an individual’s full enjoyment of humanness 
advances society’s interest.
65
 The right to dignity, as guaranteed by the Constitution, provides 
for vertical and horizontal application.
66
 Accordingly, dignity is a value that affords 
interpretation to all personal rights.
67
 The ensuing sub-chapters scrutinise the adherence of 
the doctrine of common purpose to each principle. 
2.4.2 The principle of culpability 
The right to human dignity, which encompasses the right to autonomy, accords an 
individual’s free will, whereby an individual is recognised as an autonomous moral agent.
68
 
The principle of culpability is rooted in the rule of law, the right to autonomy, and human 
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 Kremnitzer details the relationship between culpability and the right to human 
dignity, submitting:  
[I]mposing criminal responsibility upon an individual who is not culpable, or punishing him 
more severely than he deserves according to the degree of culpability, means that the state is 
using the individual as a means for achieving a purpose external to him (such as preventive, 




The principle of culpability is premised on the principle of personal responsibility, which 
holds that an individual can only be criminally liable if the ultimate unlawful consequence 
can be attributed to him or her.
71
 The principle of personal responsibility prohibits 
punishment devoid of culpability, even though the punishment may have deterrent or 
preventive results.
72
 It is submitted that the doctrine of common purpose violates the principle 
of culpability, as the imputation of the principal perpetrator’s actus reus to all the participants 
in the common purpose negatives the principle of personal responsibility.
73
  
Unterhalter discusses the doctrine of common purpose, specifically, what makes one person 
liable for the acts of another.
74
 He submits that the element of causation recognises an 
individual’s blameworthiness for the unlawful consequence.
75
 In rebuttal, the doctrine 
advances individual responsibility due to each participant’s commitment to the common 
purpose.
76
 The rebuttal stems from the proposition that “he who proposes should suffer the 
same criminal liability as he who disposes because of the moral equivalence of their 
blameworthiness”.
77
 Unterhalter notes the violation of the principle of personal responsibility 
by the application of common purpose: 
Integral to criminal law is the respect for persons as sovereign actors whose volitional action 
is freely chosen and not determined…
78
 Blame attaches to individuals in virtue of their own 
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actions because each person is sovereign over his actions and thus responsible for them. The 
law is rightly reluctant to hold one person responsible for the actions of another, for ordinarily 
another’s actions fall outside the domain over which the individual is sovereign.
79
 
A participant in a common purpose may be held liable for conduct that in no way caused or 
insignificantly contributed to the ultimate unlawful consequence. However, through the 
operation of law, the doctrine deems the conduct of a participant and a principal perpetrator 
as equally responsible for the ultimate unlawful consequence. The doctrine fails to recognise 
a participant as a person who is sovereign over his or her actions and thus responsible for 
them. Instead, the doctrine only recognises the principal perpetrator as a sovereign person, 
whose actions determine the blameworthiness and responsibility of all parties to the common 
purpose. The doctrine thus imposes collective guilt to all parties to the common purpose, the 
imposition of which runs contrary to Hart’s notions of blameworthiness and responsibility.
80
  
The right to dignity in South Africa is one of the most fundamental human rights. The right 
bears a similar importance in German law.
81
 In German law, the right to dignity is considered 
an inviolable right.
82
 Accordingly, the principle of culpability, rooted in the right to dignity, is 
paramount.
83
 German law therefore, does not recognise the principle of imputation. German 
Law accords with Hart’s jurisprudence, as it distinguishes between perpetrators and 
secondary parties, attaching liability to each participant in relation to his or her role in the 
crime.
84
 The German law thus accords with the principle of proportionality -this principle is 
potentially lost by the application of common purpose in South African law, and the adoption 
of the German position should be considered.  
2.4.3 The principle of proportionality 
The principle of proportionality holds that “punishment must stand in just proportion to the 
severity of the crime and the offender’s culpability, as disproportionate punishment results in 
offenders being used as a means for external educational and preventive purposes”.
85
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Proportionality was the central theme of the CC’s judgment in Dodo,
86
 whereby the court 
decreed the constitutional proportionality requirement of sentences. 
The doctrine of common purpose permits the conviction and sentencing of an individual who 
contributed to a limited extent to the ultimate unlawful consequence as though they were the 
main perpetrator.
87
 Furthermore, the doctrine allows for an individual to be convicted and 
sentenced for a corollary crime that he or she only foresaw as a possibility, but did not 
participate in at all.
88
 The historical punishment of individuals charged with murder by the 
application of common purpose highlights the disregard for proportionality, one of the most 
important principles of a just system of criminal law.
89
  
Prior to the death penalty being abolished, participants in a common purpose convicted of 
murder could be sentenced to death, regardless of the extent of their contribution to the death 
of the victim. The participants’ sentence furthered the government’s aim of deterring and 
preventing violent crimes. The conviction and sentence of death imposed on Ramashamola, 
the fourth accused in Safasta,
90
 exemplifies the submission. The fourth accused was part of 
the crowd that converged on Dlamini’s house. Following Dlamini firing at and wounding one 
of the individuals in the crowd, Ramashamola shouted that the Deputy Mayor should be 
killed. As the crowd pelted the deceased, a woman attempted to intervene. Ramashamola 
proceeded to slap the intervening woman. The Deputy Mayor was later killed.  
The AD admitted that “no such causal connection can be found to have been proved. This is 
particularly obvious in the case of accused Nos 2 and 4”.
91
 Nevertheless, relying on the 
doctrine of common purpose, the fourth accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death.
92
 Ramashamola’s contribution to the ultimate unlawful consequence was not 
established, thus the sentence disregarded the proportionality between the punishment and the 
offender’s culpability.
93
 Accordingly, the punishment of the Sharpeville Six, most notably 
Ramashamola, used the offenders as instruments for purposes of deterrence and prevention. 
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The Sharpeville Six case is not the only instance where disproportionate punishment was an 
issue.
94
 The imposition of disproportionate sentences during apartheid was partly due to the 
fact that the sentencing principles did not account for a participant’s culpability. 
South Africa now enjoys Constitutional supremacy, whereby proportionality is enshrined in 
the Constitution, and the sentencing guidelines reflect proportionality in common purpose 
cases. The application of the doctrine of common purpose during the post-Constitutional 
dispensation may result in disproportionate punishment, as the sentencing court may either 
disregard the principle of proportionality or misapply the ambiguous sentencing principles.
95
 
Proponents of common purpose would argue that the constitutionally-endorsed sentencing 
guidelines reflect proportionality. Furthermore, the possibility of appealing a sentence 
mitigates potential disproportionate punishment.
96
 However, after detailing the criticism 




Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
98
 prescribes minimum terms of 
imprisonment for a variety of offences. The provision makes specific reference to cases of 
murder and rape committed by a person, group of persons or syndicate acting in the execution 
or furtherance of a common purpose.
99
 Section 51(3)(a) provides an exception to the 
minimum sentences prescribed by the Act. The provision entails a duty on the court, upon 
satisfaction that substantial and compelling circumstances exist to justify the imposition of a 
lesser sentence, to impose such lesser sentence.
100
 The exception may arguably be relied on in 




 Nugent JA emphasised the significance of proportionality, by detailing the 
CC’s judgment in Dodo.
102
 Nugent JA asserted that the sentencing court cannot assume that 
the prescribed sentence is an appropriate and proportionate starting point, or even 
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 the SCA noted the importance of proportionality, holding that 
proportionality to the seriousness of the offence is a higher value which overrides the 
prescribed sentences.
105
 The principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of 
sentencing, which a judicial officer is tasked with assessing when determining an appropriate 
sentence. 
The two general principles of sentencing relevant to common purpose cases pertain to: (i) the 
severity of the crime, which also considers the blameworthiness of the offender; and (ii) the 
interest of society, which refers to the deterrence and prevention of crime.
106
 Therefore, the 
general principles utilised by a judicial officer arguably already includes a participant’s 
culpability in the common purpose, and may result in a mitigating sentence. However, the 
argument weakens for a number of reasons. First, the interests of society (deterrence and 
prevention of crime) are deemed more important compared to proportionality.
107
 
Additionally, Terblanche argues that “courts have a tendency to express the seriousness of a 
particular crime in general terms, condemning as very serious all crimes of that name”.
108
 
Furthermore, he submits that this problem also plagues the penalty clauses.
109
 Terblanche’s 
criticism is especially worrying in common purpose cases.  
The CC has emphasised the seriousness of collaborative criminal enterprises, holding that 
“the phenomenon of serious crimes committed by collective individuals, acting in concert, 
remains a significant societal scourge”.
110
 The crime of murder and rape committed in the 
execution of a common purpose carries a penalty clause.
111
 Thus, on face value, crimes 
committed in pursuance of a common purpose may potentially be regarded as significantly 
serious, thereby justifying the minimum sentences, which are not necessarily appropriate and 
proportionate to the crime committed. The interpretation of “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” does not fare well for a participant in a common purpose seeking to lessen his 
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or her sentence. The specific reference to the sentence of offenders in common purpose 
instances curtails the court’s readiness to find that lesser participation solely constitutes a 
substantial and compelling reason.
112
  
An offender’s degree of involvement in the commission of the crime constitutes a mitigating 
factor of the sentence.
113
 However, the role of common purpose as a possible mitigating 
factor remains unknown.
114
 Furthermore, the ambiguity of the sentencing principles has 
resulted in judges imposing sentences instinctively, with little consideration of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of each principle.
115
 The criticisms levelled by 
Terblanche provide for a clearer interpretation of the contrasting sentences imposed by the 
trial court and the SCA in Thebus. 
In Thebus, the trial court sentenced each of the two appellants to eight years imprisonment, 
suspended for a period of five years on certain conditions. The SCA had conflicting views 
regarding the appropriate sentence. Lewis AJA, with Olivier JA concurring, disagreed with 
Navsa JA’s judgment. Navsa JA’s judgment exemplifies the criticisms levelled by 
Terblanche. Navsa JA canvassed the present common purpose case with the same degree of 
severity of all cases of common purpose and murder, thus justifying the imposition of the 
prescribed sentence
116
 without heeding the argument that penalty clauses may not necessarily 
be appropriate and proportionate.
117
 The degree of involvement of a participant in the 
commission of the crime constitutes a mitigating factor of the sentence. However, Navsa JA’s 
judgment fails to give effect to the sentencing principles related to the seriousness of an 
offence, as the principle of proportionality is unassessed. Lewis AJA disagreed with Navsa 
JA’s judgment. First, Lewis AJA agreed that the present case fell within the ambit of the 
prescribed sentence. Lewis AJA gave effect to the principle of proportionality,
118
 but 
prioritized society’s interest of punishment.
119
 The SCA’s judgment is indicative of South 
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Africa’s continued approach, whereby the sentencing principle of one of society’s interests, 
namely punishment, trumps the offence.
120
 
It remains uncertain how the distinction between a participant’s legal responsibility and the 
limited participation in the common purpose determines the weight of constituting, either an 
aggravating or mitigating factor.
121
 The lack of guideline as to the impact of various 
circumstances also leads to inconsistency in sentences.
122
 The potential disregard of a 
participant’s culpability and the inconsistent application of the sentencing principles may 
result in the violation of a person’s right to dignity, as proportionality is unassessed or 
improperly applied. The right to freedom and security of person, which guarantees the right 
not to be tortured or be to treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way 
presupposes the right to dignity, specifically the principle of proportionality.
123
  
In Williams, the CC assessed the punishment of an offender in light of the right to dignity, 
asserting that “even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human 
dignity.”
124
 Furthermore, the CC has emphasised that human dignity will be respected only 





 Ackermann J asserted that a violation of s 12(1)(e) is an infringement of one’s 
human dignity. 
127
 Ackermann J delivered a poignant judgment pertaining to the principle of 
proportionality and its impact on the relationship between one’s right to dignity and freedom 
and security:  
The concept of proportionality goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is 
cruel, inhuman or degrading…Where the length of a sentence, which has been imposed 
because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no relation to the gravity of the 
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offence…the offence is being used essentially as a means to another end and the offender’s 
dignity assailed. Even in the absence of such features, mere disproportionality between the 
offence and the period of imprisonment would also tend to treat the offender as a means to an 
end, thereby denying the offender’s humanity.
128
 
The failure to account for the principle of proportionality or a misapplication thereof 
ultimately entails participants to a common purpose being treated as a means to an end.
129
 
This failure amplifies the ensuing argument that the doctrine violates the principle of fair 
labelling. 
2.4.4 The principle of fair labelling 
Ashworth is accredited with the introduction of the concept of ‘representative labelling’, 
whereby he submits “both out of fairness to the individual and in order to ensure accuracy in 
the penal system, the legal distinction of an offence should fairly represent the nature of the 
offender’s criminality”.
130
 Glanville Williams relabelled Ashworth’s concept of 
‘representative labelling’, ‘fair labelling’, which arises “when the relevant fault element does 
not wholly apply to the particulars of the offence stated in the conviction”.
131
 Ashworth’s 
development of the concept expresses as situations where “widely felt distinctions between 
kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are represented and signalled by the law, and 
that offences are subdivided and labelled so as to present fairly the nature and magnitude of 
the law-breaking”.
132
 The distinction between the degrees of wrongdoing is based on 
proportionality, whereby offenders are labelled and punished in proportion to their 
wrongdoing.  
The principle of fair labelling is justified on the “common pattern of thought in society” that 
“where people reasonably regard two types of conduct as different, the law should try to 
reflect that difference”.
133
 The principle of fair labelling ensures that when a crime occurs, 
                                                          
128
 Ibid para 38. 
129
 J Dressler ‘Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offence’ (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 427 at 428; Hoctor op cit (n61) at 306; O Lagodny ‘Human dignity and its impact on German 
substantive criminal law and criminal procedure’ (1999) 33 Israel LR 375 at 578. 
130
 A Ashworth ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’ in CFH Tapper (ed) Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in 
Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (1981) 45 at 56.  
131
 G Williams ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42 Cambridge LJ 85. 
132
 Ashworth et al op cit (n130) at 77. 
133
 Ibid.  
35 
 
justice is not only done, but is seen to be done.
134
 Fair labelling requires offences to reflect 
distinctions in moral wrongfulness, as the gravity of offences is reflected through the harm 
which was caused or threatened and through the accused’s personal moral culpability.
135
 
The importance of fair labelling of criminal offences is based on a number of legitimate inter-
related reasons, which are premised on the communicative function of the criminal offence 
label.
136
 First, counter arguments to Ashworth’s proportionality submission rest on the court’s 
sentencing guidelines accounting for the level of a person’s wrongdoing. However, the 
problems noted in relation to the principle of proportionality
137
 potentially negate instances 
when a judicial officer will account for the level of a participant’s wrongdoing. Accordingly, 
as noted by Ashworth, “once the label is entered on the person’s criminal record the passage 
of time will dim recollections of the precise nature of the offence and may result in the label 
being taken at face value”.
138
 In effect, the wrongdoing of the defendant and the wrong 
suffered by the victim will be incorrectly represented to the public.
139
   
The communicative function of the criminal offence label encapsulates the declaratory 
function, whereby the label “symbolises the degree of condemnation that should be attributed 
to the offender and signals to society how that particular offender should be regarded”.
140
 As 
members of the public merely obtain criminal trial outcomes via social media, newspapers, 
television, radio and other media, the communication of verdicts require fair labelling to 
ensure fair public opinion.
141
 Media reports are inaccurate, as they simply convey the 
outcome of the trial without discussing the legal intricacies thereof.  
Additionally, fair labelling provides communication to the offender, whereby the defendant 
“knows exactly what he has done wrong and why he is being punished, in order that his 
punishment appears meaningful to him, not just an arbitrary harsh treatment.”
142
 Accordingly, 
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fair labelling may have a deterrent effect, as potential offenders may be deterred from causing 
more harm because they might incur greater condemnation.
143
 Fair labelling provides 
important communication to external agencies, whereby convicted persons may be denied 
employment based on their criminal record that unfairly labels them.
144
  
The common pattern of thought in society is that the law should reflect the difference 
between two types of conduct.
145
 Therefore, where the principal offender commits the murder 
and a participant merely serves as a look-out, the law should reflect this difference in the type 
of conduct by fair labelling of the parties. The distinction in the types of conduct, and the 
label attached thereto will ensure that justice is not only done, but is seen to be done. The 
label afforded to participants does not give effect to the deterring results of fair labelling, as 
participants who barely contribute to the commission of the crime may conclude that 
contributing to a greater extent would carry the same consequences and act accordingly.
146
  
The major problem of the unfair label relates to an accused’s right to equality. A participant’s 
right to equality is infringed, as individuals who are not participants in a common purpose 
and commit unlawful conduct similar to a participant in a common purpose would receive the 
full benefit of fair labelling.
147
 There are a number of appropriate and less restrictive 
alternative convictions in common purpose cases, such as public violence, conspiracy, 
incitement, attempt, accomplice liability, and any other lesser charge.
148
 The alternative 
convictions would reflect the distinctions in moral wrongfulness, whereby the gravity of 
offences is reflected through the harm which was caused or threatened and through the 
accused’s personal moral culpability.
149
  
The principle of fair labelling in international law is recognised as one of the fundamental 
principles of criminal law, and characterises a liberal system of criminal justice.
150
 South 
African law’s collective treatment of parties to a common purpose fails to recognise the 
distinction in a participant’s wrongdoing. Accordingly, a participant faces social, 
psychological and economic harms, where it cannot be said that justice is done or seen to be 
done. It is submitted that had the CC grappled with the jurisprudence on fair labelling, the 
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appellants’ argument that the doctrine stigmatises and de-humanises people by treating them 





























In Thebus, the appellants argued that the right to be presumed innocent was infringed through 
the doctrine of common purpose derogating from the causation requirement for consequence 
crimes. However, the CC held that the derogation of the causation requirement did not 
infringe the right to be presumed innocent.
151
 This chapter expands on the appellants’ 
argument by detailing the nature and scope of an accused’s right to be presumed innocent. 
The content of the right illumines two major arguments premised on the same principle: the 
possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt will exist when a 




2.5.2 Nature and scope 
The right to a fair trial, as guaranteed in s 35(3) of the Constitution, provides an open-list
153
 
of protection to every accused person, which activates upon determination of the accused’s 
guilt.
154
 The presumption of innocence stands as the core right encompassed in the right to a 
fair trial.
155
 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution, the right to be presumed innocent, is 
premised on the conflict against punitive authoritarian state measures and the need to ensure a 
legitimate criminal justice system.
156
 The presumption of innocence, a means to curtail 
incorrect convictions,
157
 finds life through the burden of proof, whereby the state must 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
158
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The right to a fair trial, which encompasses the right to be presumed innocent, is safeguarded 
by the right to dignity.
159
 The Supreme Court of Canada has enunciated the consequences of 
violating the presumption of innocence, holding: 
The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and 
every person accused by the state of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal 
offence faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical 
liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as other social, 
psychological and economic harms.
160
 
In order for the State to establish guilt, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
voluntary conduct, unlawfulness, causation (in consequence crimes), criminal capacity and 
fault of the accused. The CC thus held “guilt is only established when it is clear that the 




The scope of the presumption of innocence, specifically the requisite elements to establish an 
accused’s guilt, has been clarified by Sundby’s three approaches.
162
 The first approach, 
expansive proceduralism, entails the presumption of innocence being applicable to all facts, 
including the elements, defences, exemptions, exceptions and excuses.
163
 The second 
approach, restrictive proceduralism, applies the presumption of innocence only to the facts 
encompassing the elements of a crime.
164
 The third approach, substantivism, applies the 
burden of proof to facts that constitutionally warrant punishment.
165
 Schwikkard, favoring 
Sundby’s substantivism approach, asserts:  
In the South African context where recognition is given at common law to comprehensive 
principles of criminal liability, the substantive approach would require that any fact which 
pertains to the existence of a fact which must be established in order for the state to 
constitutionally punish a person, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
166
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Correspondingly, in Zuma, Kentrige AJ held: “the presumption of innocence will be infringed 
whenever there is a possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt”.
167
  
Moseneke J affirmed the doctrine’s derogation of the causal nexus requirement on the basis 
that without the derogation, the prosecution of collaborative criminal enterprises would be 
intractable and ineffectual. The affirmation contradicts the CC’s earlier judgment in Mbatha, 
Prinsloo, whereby the CC asserted that an infringement of the presumption of innocence 
cannot be justified by relying on the need to prevent the alleged guilty party escaping 
conviction.
168
 Moseneke J’s reliance on utilitarian instrumental arguments,
169
 whilst 
disregarding earlier CC decisions,
170
 has created a false finding that the doctrine of common 
purpose complies with an accused’s right to be presumed innocent. This is mistakenly 
bolstered through Moseneke J’s holding that the derogation of a causal nexus does not violate 
the presumption of innocence:  
In my view, when the doctrine of common purpose is properly applied, there is no reasonable 
possibility that an accused person could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable 
doubt as to his or her guilt. In my view, the common purpose doctrine does not trench the 
right to be presumed innocent.
171
 
An accurate description of the presumption of innocence, coupled with Burchell’s arguments 
on the matter,
172
 serves as the foundation of the rebuttal against Moseneke J’s arguments. 
There are two major arguments that support the submission that an accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent, whose conviction is secured by the application of common purpose, is 
infringed. The arguments entail the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt being present when the necessary elements of the crime have not been 
established and the accused has not been afforded viable defences.
173
 Furthermore, the 
application of common purpose in instances where the identity of the principal perpetrator is 
unknown will bolster each argument.  
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2.5.3 Causation: a necessary element of consequence crimes 
Burchell agrees with Moseneke J’s initial submission that “the requirement of a causal nexus 
is not a definitional element of every crime”,
174
 as circumstance crimes do not necessitate a 
causal nexus requirement. Burchell faults the CC’s failure to ascribe the definitional elements 
of certain crimes devoid of the requirement of causation. He focuses on South African 
criminal law’s accepted principle of requiring a causal nexus for consequence crimes. The 
doctrine of common purpose is predominantly applied to murder cases; thus Burchell submits 
that the causation requirement constitutes a definitional element of the crimes commonly 
charged:  
…the common-purpose rule goes even further and conclusively imputes the causal 
contribution of one person in a common purpose to another participant…the imputation rule 
dispenses altogether with the normal requirement in consequence crimes of a causal link…the 
prosecution does not even have to adduce any evidence of such a causal link.
175
  
The CC’s assertions in Coetzee, whereby “guilt is only established when it is clear that the 
accused has no defence and that all the particular elements of the particular crime have been 
established”,
176
 coupled with Sundby’s substantivism approach, whereby “any fact which 
pertains to the existence of a fact which must be established in order for the state to 
constitutionally punish a person, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”,
177
 thwart the 
CC’s   derogation of a causal nexus for consequence crimes. The effect of the deviating 
definitional elements of similar crimes infringes an accused’s right to be presumed innocent.  
The submission of infringement finds authority in Kentridge AJ’s assertions in Zuma, 
whereby “the presumption of innocence will be infringed whenever there is a possibility of 
conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt”.
178
 Accordingly, the possibility of 
conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt will exist when the necessary elements 
of the crime have not been established.
179
  
Moseneke J supports the imputation of causation on the basis that “it is often difficult to 
prove that the act of each person or of a particular person in the group contributed causally to 
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 The derogation of the causal element is founded on the social need to 
control crime committed in the course of joint enterprises. Appropriately, Kremnitzer 
delineates the consequence of guilt devoid of satisfying the requisite criminal elements: 
It no longer turns to the perpetrator with well-founded approbation, it speaks over his head, 




The imputation of causation from the principal perpetrator to a participant in the common 
purpose violates the fundamental criminal law principle that in consequence crimes an 
accused’s guilt, which includes the indispensable requirement of causation, must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The necessary element of causation that remains unestablished 
entails the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, thus 
infringing the right to be presumed innocent.
182
  
The application of common purpose in instances where the identity of the principal 
perpetrator is unknown evinces a further infringement of an accused’s right to be presumed 
innocent.
183
 The absence of a principal perpetrator entails the prosecution being relieved of 
establishing the necessary requirement of causation altogether, as the element of causation 
cannot be assessed in light of a particular person. Therefore, the application of common 
purpose would impute a limited or non-existent causation, which has not been established, 
and impute it to the other participants in the common purpose.  
2.5.4 Unavailable viable defences 
The right to be presumed innocent requires an accused to be afforded all viable defences, as 
the unavailability of viable defences results in the possibility of conviction despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt.
184
 The imputation of causation in instances where the 
identity of the principal perpetrator is both known and unknown results in an additional 
infringement of the right to be presumed innocent, as viable defences are not afforded to the 
participants.  
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In instances where the identity of the perpetrator is known, the prosecution must prove 
causation beyond a reasonable doubt. The factual and legal causation tests would be assessed 
entirely for the principal perpetrator. Furthermore, the principal perpetrator would be 
afforded all the viable defences excluding causation. If the prosecution establishes causation 
on the part of the principal perpetrator, the causation element would be imputed to all 
participants to the common purpose. The imputation of causation results in the prosecution 
being relieved of the necessity to establish causation on the part of the participants. The 
necessary factual and legal causation tests would not be assessed at all for the participants, 
and any possible defences excluding causation would be rendered nugatory. A similar and 
even more dire outcome results where the doctrine is applied in instances where the identity 
of the principal perpetrator is unknown.  
The prosecution’s failure to identify the principal perpetrator means that causation – the 
factual and legal tests thereof – are not assessed at all. Any possible defence excluding 
causation available to the principal offender is unaccounted for and the nonexistent causation 
element is still imputed to all other participants. In effect, the participants may be convicted 
despite guilt not being proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as a viable defence excluding 
causation of the unknown principal perpetrator remains uncontested, yet imputed. The 
participants would then also suffer from the same unfair and unjust disregard of their own 
possible defences excluding causation. 
In Zuma, the CC held that the constitutional right to a fair trial embraced “a concept of 
substantive fairness that required criminal trials to be conducted in accordance with just those 
notions of basic fairness and justice”.
185
 Similarly, in Dzukuda, the CC held that at the heart 




The right to a fair trial requires that the trial be conducted in accordance with ‘notions of basic 
fairness and justice’ and these notions are not confined to procedural justice. ‘Imputing’ or 
‘transferring’ conduct from one person to another is not in keeping with fundamental notions 
of fairness and justice and, in fact, smacks of guilt by association.
187
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Burchell’s assertion is amplified in instances where the identity of the principal perpetrator is 
unknown. The imputation of the non-established causation element contradicts the doctrine of 
common purpose, which is founded on the imputation of causation. A participant’s right to be 
presumed innocent is infringed, as the necessary element of causation, even though imputed 
and the availability of viable defences, are not established. In light of the apparent crime 





















2.6 A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND 
SECURITY OF PERSON 
 
In Thebus, the CC assessed the appellants’ argument that the doctrine infringes their right to 
freedom and security of person. This chapter begins by detailing the enquiry set out in De 
Lange v Smuts;
188




Section 12 of the Constitution guarantees that everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of person, which includes the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause.
190





 protection, whereby an infringement requires justification under the limitation 
clause. The CC notes that the substantive protection concerns the right not to be deprived of 
liberty for reasons that are not acceptable.
193
 Additionally, the procedural protection is 
concerned with the manner whereby a person is deprived of freedom, provided by the right 
not to be detained without trial.
194
 The threshold for an alleged violation of the right not to be 
deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause entails a two-stage assessment, namely: 




The first stage of the assessment necessitates “a rational connection between the deprivation 
and some objectively determinable purpose” in order for the deprivation of freedom to not be 
arbitrary.
196
 On the second stage of the assessment, Ackermann J asserted that “the concept of 
‘just cause’ must be grounded upon and consonant with the values expressed in s 1 of the 
Constitution and gathered from the provisions of the Constitution as a whole”.
197
 Ackermann 
J considered a number of factors indicative of a ‘just cause’, namely: the nature and extent of 
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the limitation; the importance of its purpose; the relationship between the limitation and its 
purpose; and whether that purpose could be achieved by less restrictive means.
198
 
Accordingly, the determination of a ‘just cause’ entails a proportionality enquiry, similar to 
that which a court performs under a s 36 limitations analysis. Ackermann J’s majority 
judgment in De Lange set the threshold precedent concerning the determination of a violation 
of the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause. Therefore, the 
determination of such a violation in Thebus necessitates an adherence to the precedent set in 
De Lange. 
In Thebus, Moseneke J’s assessment of the threshold enquiry for s 12(1)(a) of the 
Constitution falls short of the enquiry set in De Lange. Moseneke J dispenses with the first 
stage of the enquiry by simply holding that “common purpose does not amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation of freedom. The doctrine is rationally connected to the legitimate objective of 
limiting and controlling joint criminal enterprise”.
199
 Moseneke J fails to support his claim 
that there is a causal link between the doctrine and crime control. The CC justifies the causal 
link based on instrumental arguments of the crime control benefits of common purpose.
200
  
Thereafter, Moseneke J justifies the second stage of the threshold enquiry by attesting the 
crime-control benefits of the doctrine.
201
 Moseneke J’s assessment of the second stage 
focused exclusively on the purpose of the limitation and the importance of that purpose. The 
CC disregarded the other factors that indicate whether the deprivation is for a ‘just cause’, 
such as: whether the doctrine is an appropriate and fitting means for achieving the purpose, or 
whether it goes further than strictly necessary; and whether the same objective could be 
achieved equally well by less invasive means. The CC viewed these factors as 
‘proportionality arguments’, holding that they were only relevant to a general limitations 
analysis.
202
 In assessing whether the deprivation is a ‘just cause’, Schwikkard contends that 
the CC failed to consider what the minimum standard of criminal culpability ought to be.
203
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The arguments leveled by Moseneke J to satisfy the threshold enquiry required under s 
12(1)(a) of the Constitution were condemned by both Burchell and Schwikkard. They 
contended that the CC utilised instrumental arguments to justify the assessment of the 
threshold enquiry.
204
 Moseneke J contends that “absent the rule of common purpose, all but 
actual perpetrators of a crime and their accomplices will be beyond the reach of our criminal 
justice system, despite their unlawful and intentional participation in the commission of the 
crime”.
205
 However, as Burchell submits, there are a number of less restrictive means 
available for punishing individuals who unlawfully and intentionally participate in the 
commission of crimes, such as convicting the individuals as accomplices or charging the 
individuals with lesser crimes.
206
 Furthermore, Schwikkard notes Moseneke J’s reliance on 
instrumental arguments, as no evidence is tendered to support the claim, firstly, that the 
doctrine achieves the purpose of crime control, and secondly, that the doctrine is the only law 
capable of criminalising crimes by common design.
207
  
It is submitted that on a proper application of the threshold precedent set in De Lange, the CC 
in Thebus would have concluded that the doctrine of common purpose violates an 
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2.7 THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY: UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ON 
ANALOGOUS GROUNDS 
The appellants in Thebus did not cover all the arguments levelled against the constitutionality 
of the doctrine. Burchell, noting the distinct treatment of categories of accused people, 
contends:  
…the common-purpose rule could also be said to treat a particular category of accused people 
unequally in contrast to accused persons, who are charged with committing consequence 
crimes, but who are not engaged in a common purpose.
208
  
There are two instances of contrasting treatment amongst particular categories of accused 
people. The first is that explained by Burchell in the above quote. The second instance relates 
to the distinct treatment between participants in the common purpose and the principal 
perpetrator thereof. Both instances suggest a claim of unfair discrimination. Accordingly, the 
ensuing sub-chapter evaluates this proposition by applying the test for unfair discrimination 
delineated in Harksen v Lane.
209
  
The equality provisions of the Constitution provide everyone with equality before the law, 
which includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms, and prohibits unfair 
discrimination on the listed and analogous grounds.
210
 The CC stresses that “like justice, 
equality delayed is equality denied”.
211
 The right to equality encompasses both formal and 
substantive equality.
212
 Human dignity forms the foundation of the right to equality, whereby 
every person must be treated with equal respect and worth.
213
 Accordingly, the right to 
equality, guaranteed in s 9 of the Constitution, safeguards a person from differentiation 
premised on one of the listed grounds or analogous grounds that have the potential to infringe 
a person’s human dignity.
214
 The CC has premised human dignity as the cornerstone of an 
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 Malherbe’s famous quotation captures the relationship between dignity 
and equality: “[E]quality without dignity is inhuman”.
216
  
The listed grounds contained in s 9 do not formally recognise the contrasting treatment of the 
categories of people, namely: participants to the common purpose; the principal perpetrator; 
and accused persons charged with a consequence crime but not engaged in a common 
purpose.
217
 However, as s 9 prohibits unfair discrimination based on analogous grounds, the 




First, the differentiation relates to the unequal treatment of people based on “attributes and 
characteristics attaching to them” that are not related to the specified grounds but are 
nevertheless comparable to them,
219
 namely: (i) the existence of a common purpose; and (ii) 
the person’s degree of participation in the common purpose.
220
 The existence of a common 
purpose determines whether the principles related to common purpose are applied, whereby 
the state does not need to determine the causal nexus between a participant’s act and the 
ultimate unlawful consequence. In contrast, the non-existence of a common purpose entails 
the application of the ordinary principles of criminal law.  
The second stage involves the determination of the effect of the differentiation.
221
 The effect 
must impair the person’s fundamental dignity or affect the person adversely in a comparably 
serious manner.
222





 and freedom and security of person
225
 infringed by the court’s 
differentiating treatment. The differentiation, which is based on an analogous ground, thus 
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amounts to discrimination. The discrimination is indirect, as the practice, while appearing 




At this point in the enquiry, a participant in a common purpose bears the onus of proving that 
the discrimination is unfair by assessing the impact of the discrimination on the complainant 
and others in his or her situation.
227
 The CC has detailed some factors that guide the enquiry 
as to whether the discriminatory provision has an unfair impact on a complainant: (i) the 
position of the complainants in society; (ii) the nature of the provision or power and the 
purpose sought to be achieved by it; and (iii) any other factor that impairs a person’s 
fundamental dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious manner.
228
 The 
position of a participant in a common purpose in society is identical to that of most accused 
persons in South Africa. The majority of accused persons are indigent, thus navigating a trial 
without the effective assistance of a defence lawyer renders the possibility of contesting a 
charge in terms of the doctrine of common purpose improbable.
229
 The doctrine is a law 
directed at controlling crime. However, there is no evidence to establish its effectiveness, and 
as Burchell submits, there are a number of alternative, less restrictive means available to 
satisfy the need to suppress joint enterprise crimes.
230
 The other factors that impair a person’s 
fundamental dignity or impair a person in a comparably serious manner relate to the criminal 
law legal principles that the doctrine violates.
231
  
In Thebus, the CC merely referenced the “evocative history of the application of the doctrine 
of common purpose in political and other group prosecutions”.
232
 For the purpose of the 
Harksen test, the court would not be able to ignore the substantial and compelling criticism 
leveled against the application of the doctrine in a number of cases, most notably in Safatsa 
and Nzo, as the determination of unfair discrimination must take cognisance of South Africa’s 
related history,
233
 coupled with the structural inequality that promotes and perpetuates the 
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subordination of certain individuals.
234
 It seems possible, if not probable, that on a proper 
application of the Harksen test, the treatment of participants in a common purpose, in contrast 
to the principal perpetrator or an accused person charged with a consequence crime but not 
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2.8 A KANTIAN APPROACH TO A LIMITATION CLAUSE  
 
2.8.1 Introduction 
In any democratic criminal justice system there is a tension between, 
on the one hand, the public interest in bringing criminals to book and, 
on the other, the equally great public interest in ensuring that justice 
is manifestly done to all, even those suspected of conduct which 
would put them beyond the pale.
235
 
It has been demonstrated that the doctrine of common purpose potentially infringes a number 
of rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Section 36 of the Constitution, which governs the 
situations in which constitutional rights may be limited, enjoins a court to balance five 
relevant factors, namely: the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
236
 Ramraj 
submits that the relevant factors to be considered in a s 36 limitation clause analysis allow for 
both a utilitarian and a Kantian interpretation.
237
 The CC has vacillated between the two 
approaches, thereby rendering a conclusive limitation analysis unpredictable.
238
 Upon 
scrutinising the distinction between the approaches, coupled with their adoption in a number 
of cases, this thesis endorses the Kantian approach. In light of the supported Kantian 
approach, a limitation analysis will be presented to ascertain whether the infringement of the 
relevant rights discussed is reasonable and justifiable.   
2.8.2 The utilitarian approach
239
 
The utilitarian approach warrants the limitation of constitutional rights as instrumentally 
important in securing pressing social objectives. The CC, in adopting a utilitarian approach 
merely seeks to balance the right and the countervailing legislative interest or objective. 
Ramraj contends that “the language we would expect to find in the corresponding legal 
judgments would be the language of balance and weight”.
240
 He presents the case of 
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 as an example of the utilitarian approach and a warning of the problems the 
approach crafts. In Mamabolo, the CC assessed whether the offence of scandalising the court 
limited the right to freedom of expression. Kriegler J repetitively measured the weight and 




Ramraj notes a number of problems manifested by Kriegler J’s adoption of the utilitarian 
approach. First, the CC provides no insight into the manner in which the weight of the 
competing interests is determined.
243
 Secondly, the CC balances and weighs competing 
interests that are disparate.
244
 Lastly, Ramraj questions the competency of the court in 
measuring the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
245
 Ramraj then asserts that 
the concurring judgment of Sachs J in Mamabolo can “explain how a non-utilitarian approach 
can be reconciled with the limitation clause’.
246
 Sachs J contends that the limitation of rights 
is not merely dependent on a utilitarian weighing of costs and benefits, but rather “as part of a 
broader framework of rights in which rights are subject to limitation only to protect the 
framework of the rights itself”.
247
 The concurring judgment of Sachs J introduces the Kantian 
approach to the interpretation of the limitation analysis. 
2.8.3 The Kantian approach 
The Kantian approach recognises the autonomy of each individual. Constitutional rights are 
founded on the respect for an individual’s autonomy and dignity, thus prohibiting the person 
from being used as a means to achieve collective welfare. Alan Brudner, who discussed the 
approaches in relation to Canadian law, holds that on the Kantian approach, a right “can 
never be reduced to an interest with a certain value and then be traded off whenever 
necessary to produce greater overall value”.
248
 Furthermore, Brudner explains a Kantian 
approach to limiting a right: 
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Special reasons are needed to limit or override the right, reasons that are consistent with the 




Ramraj upholds the Kantian approach, as courts are addressing the jurisprudential content of 
the nature of rights, rather than balancing intangible interests.
250
 Furthermore, the Kantian 
approach endorses the competency of CC judges.
251
 Ramraj concludes: 
Whether the circumstances are so compelling that the framework of the rights itself is 
threatened is not simply an empirical question to be settled by a mechanical application of a 
utilitarian cost-benefit calculus, but rather a fundamental normative question based on an 
understanding of constitutional rights that is grounded in the dignity of the person- and, in this 




In Thebus, Moseneke J holds that the appellants’ claim that the doctrine of common purpose 
infringes the rights to dignity, freedom and security of person, and the presumption of 
innocence, “rests on the assumption that common purpose invades a constitutionally 
protected right to a degree disproportionate to the need and objective of crime control”.
253
 
Despite the CC holding that common purpose did not limit any of the rights asserted by the 
appellants, and thus not undertaking a limitation analysis, Moseneke J’s crime control 
balancing assertions are indicative of the adoption of a utilitarian approach. If the 
constitutionality of the doctrine of common purpose was challenged in its entirety, as 
Moseneke J in Thebus suggests it should have been,
254
 the adoption of either a utilitarian or 
Kantian approach will determine not only the ambit of fundamental rights, but also the shape 
of substantive criminal law.
255
  
For the purpose of this thesis, the limitation analysis is premised on a Kantian approach. Two 
of the factors relevant for the limitation analysis, namely, the nature of the right and the 
nature and extent of the limitation, have been discussed in the entirety of this chapter. Thus, 
the remaining three factors will be discussed below.  
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2.8.4 Section 36 of the Constitution 
 
2.8.4.1 The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
Reasonableness requires the limitation to serve some purpose, whilst justifiability requires the 
purpose to be important in a constitutional democracy.
256
 There is undoubtedly a need to 
control crime so as to realise everyone’s constitutionally protected rights.
257
 Chaskalson P’s 
judgment in Makwanyane cogently captures this, holding that “the need for a strong deterrent 
to violent crime is an end the validity of which is not open to question”.
258
 
The Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right to be free from all forms of violence.
259
 The CC and the SCA have also 
placed a legal duty on the state, to protect persons from violent crime.
260
 The principal object 
of the doctrine of common purpose, as declared by Moseneke J in Thebus, is “to criminalise 
collective criminal conduct and thus to satisfy the social ‘need to control crime committed in 
the course of joint enterprises’”.
261
 The application of the doctrine throughout the apartheid 
regime served as a government tool to criminalise black people.
262
 The application of the 
doctrine in the Constitutional-era attempts to satisfy the State’s duty to protect persons from 
violent crime.  
The limitation, being the application of the doctrine of common purpose, is purely directed at 
crime control.
263
 Crime control is important; however, it should not solely vindicate the 
violation of constitutional rights. Interpreting the limitation of rights according to a Kantian 
approach ensures that individuals are not used as a means to an end; an end being the 
deterring and effective prosecution of the legitimate pressing social need of group, organised 
or collaborative misdeeds.
264
 The CC’s judgment in Dlamini
265
 hinted at the adoption of a 
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Kantian approach when interpreting the limitation of rights in relation to the importance of 
crime control: 
 
Although the level of criminal activity is clearly a relevant and important factor in the 
limitations exercise undertaken in respect of section 36, it is not the only factor relevant to 
that exercise. One must be careful to ensure that the alarming level of crime is not used to 






 the CC cited the abovementioned dictum with approval.
268
 The CC asserted 
that “the prevalence of serious crime calls for government action, but does not provide a 
blank cheque for the legislature to erase all procedural safeguards. Indeed, it is precisely 
when public emotion is at its highest that procedural protection against possible miscarriage 
of justice is most necessary”.
269
 It is clear that on a Kantian approach, the limitation of rights 
cannot simply be justified on the importance of crime control alone.  
 
2.8.4.2 The relation between the limitation and its purpose  
A legitimate limitation of a right necessitates a causal connection between the law and its 
purpose.
270
 In order to establish a causal connection, especially where the justification rests 
on factual and/or policy considerations, such material must be put before the court.
271
 
Chaskalson P’s judgment in Makwanyane provides a bulwark against the reliance of a 
utilitarian approach supported by instrumental arguments to establish a causal connection 
between the limitation and its purpose. Chaskalson P rejected the Attorney-General’s 
argument that the death penalty served as a vital mechanism for the deterrence, prevention 
and retribution of violent crimes.
272
 The rejection was based on the fact that the Attorney-
General’s argument was instrumental, as no evidence was provided to support his 
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 Moseneke’s assertion that the doctrine limits and controls crime, as well as 
deters violent crimes, mimics that of the Attorney-General’s argument in Makwanyane – an 
instrumental argument, aimed at endorsing the doctrine’s rational connection to a legitimate 




A court, heeding the Kantian inspired dictum in Dlamini, Manamela and Makwanyane, 
would require something far greater than a simple cost-benefit instrumental argument as 
levelled by Moseneke. Aptly, Schwikkard forewarns the tension between instrumental 
arguments on human rights and criminal law adjudication: 
In the area of criminal justice, the justification for limiting rights is inevitably instrumental: 
the infringement is necessary to meet the pressing social need of combating crime. In order 
for these instrumental arguments to be clear and compelling they need to be supported by 
evidence so that their rationality can be tested. The weighting and evaluation of these 




Moseneke declares that “absent the rule of common purpose, all but actual perpetrators of a 
crime and their accomplices will be beyond the reach of our criminal justice system, despite 
their unlawful and intentional participation in the commission of the crime”.
276
 Moseneke’s 
declaration ignores the caveat in Makwanyane, wherein Chaskalson P notes:  
In the debate as to the deterrent effect of the death sentence, the issue is sometimes dealt with 
as if the choice to be made is between the death sentence and the murder going unpunished. 
That is of course not so. The choice to be made is between putting the criminal to death and 
subjecting the criminal to the severe punishment of a long term of imprisonment which, in an 
appropriate case, could be a sentence of life imprisonment. Both are deterrents, and the 
question is whether the possibility of being sentenced to death, rather than being sentenced to 
life imprisonment, has a marginally greater deterrent effect.
277
 
The eradication of the doctrine common purpose from South Africa’s law, premised as a fear-
inducing proclamation, will not save participants to a common purpose from criminal liability 
for two essential reasons. First, there is no evidence to intimate Moseneke’s premise or prove 




 Thebus supra (n2) para 34. 
275
 Schwikkard op cit (n203) at 294. 
276
 Thebus supra (n2) para 34. 
277
 Makwanyane supra (n56) para 123. 
58 
 
the doctrine’s effectual prosecution of perpetrators.
278
 Dressler notes that “there is no 
empirical research that directly focuses on the comparative dangerousness of parties to 
crimes. Statistics pertaining to crime commission, convictions, and recidivism do not 
distinguish between perpetrators and their assistants, or between types of accomplices”.
279
 
Moseneke’s argument supporting the deterrent effect of common purpose implicity rests on 
South Africa’s minimum sentencing scheme recognising the crimes of murder and rape 
committed in the furtherance of a common purpose.
280
 However, Michael Tonry, one of the 
foremost international sentencing experts, contends that minimum sentencing schemes do not 
have any significant effect on the rates of serious crime.
281
 Secondly, there are number of 
alternative, less restrictive means capable of achieving crime control.  
2.8.4.3 Whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
The reasonableness and justifiability of the limitation ultimately depend on whether the law 
invades rights more than is necessary to achieve its purpose.
282
 Accordingly, the limitation 
will be disproportionate if alternative means could achieve the same purpose by either not 
limiting the rights at all or limiting the rights to a lesser extent.
283
 One of the court’s most 
recent decisions presents the balancing of society’s interest for crime control with a Kantian 
interpretation of an individual’s rights in light of the less restrictive means factor.  
In Minister of Police and Others v Kunjana,
284
 the CC placed a significant weight on the 
existence of alternative measures to s 11(1)(a) and (g) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act.
285
 Despite Mhlantla J emphasising the importance of the provisions for the achievement 
of crime control, the CC found the provisions to constitute an infringement of an individual’s 
right to privacy and dignity, the infringement of which was not a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation, as s 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act
286
 served as a less restrictive means. In 
                                                          
278
 Institute for Security Studies South African Crime Quarterly No 58 Dec 2016; D Bruce ‘Public Order 
Transparency: Using Freedom of Information Laws to Analyse the Policing of Protest’ ISS South African Crime 
Quarterly No. 58 (2016) 23 at  25; Crime Stats South Africa; Africa Check South Africa’s 2015/2016 Crime 
Statistics; Institute for Security Services SA Crime Stats; South African Institute of Race Relations Crime and 
Security Survey 2014/2015; South African Institute of Race Relations Crime and Security Survey 2014/2015. 
279
 J Dressler ‘Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old 
Problem’ (1985) 37 Hastings LJ 91 at 111-2; Walker op cit (n54) at 92. 
280
 Section 51(1) of Act 105 of 1997. 
281
 M Tonry ‘The mostly unintended effects of mandatory penalties: Two centuries of consistent findings’ 
(2009) 38 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 65 at 100. 
282
 Currie et al op cit (n66) at 171.  
283
 Ibid at 170. 
284
 Minister of Police v Kunjana 2016 ZACC 21. 
285
 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
286
 51 of 1977. 
59 
 
Thebus, Moseneke asserts a similar importance of the purpose of common purpose as 
Mhlantla J in Kunjana. As Moseneke J found that the doctrine did not limit any of the rights 
asserted by the appellants, the contention on the relative degree of the invasiveness of 
common purpose in comparison to other forms of liability was not discussed. However, as 
argued above, the doctrine does infringe a number of rights and an enquiry into less 
restrictive means is necessary.  
The doctrine of common purpose is not the only means of addressing the pressing social need 
of prosecuting and deterring group, organised or collective misdeeds. Burchell elucidates a 
number of alternative convictions that would have achieved the deterrent and preventative 
purpose sought in common purpose cases.
287
 The conviction of lesser offences is one such 
alternative conviction. Burchell submits that in Safatsa, the accused could be liable for 
conspiracy, incitement to commit the other crimes, attempted arson, and/or arson.
288
 
Furthermore, the second appellant’s conviction for treason in Nzo could have achieved the 
desired purpose without the coupling of a conviction of murder.
289
 Similarly, in Thebus, the 
appellants could have been convicted of public violence, and the second appellant could have 
additionally been convicted of attempting to defeat the administration of justice.
290
 Parker 
levels an identical argument to Burchell, noting that in many of the cases of unrest between 
September 1984 and May 1987, these cases could have been dealt with in terms of the 
common law crime of public violence and the provisions of the Internal Security Act.
291
  
Burchell advocates for the extinction of the doctrine of common purpose, in favor of an 
additional less restrictive means, namely accomplice liability.
292
 His support is based on the 
fact that the problems associated with the doctrine are primarily caused by the derogation of a 
causal nexus. Liability based on accomplice liability which necessitates a causal nexus 
between the assistance of the accomplice and the commission of the offence by the 
perpetrator,
293
 does not have the problems associated with common purpose.
294
 Burchell 
argues that in Thebus, where Moseneke J relied on the English joint enterprise rule to support 
South Africa’s doctrine, the support was mistaken,
295
 as the English rule does not regard 
                                                          
287
 Burchell op cit (n51) at 486-488. 
288






 See ss 46-53 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982; Parker op cit (n279) at 78. 
292
 Burchell op cit (n51) at 487. 
293
 S v Williams 1980 (1) SA 60 (A) at 176. 
294
 Khoza supra (n94) at 1013B-F, 1054A-B. 
295
 Thebus supra (n2) para 22.  
60 
 
participants in a joint enterprise as co-perpetrators by imputing the liability, but regards them 
as accomplices.
296
 Despite Burchell’s overwhelming support for the replacement of the 
doctrine of common purpose with accomplice liability, the law related to accomplice liability 
is not devoid of problems.
297
 However, the problems related to accomplice liability are 
theoretically due to the lack of development of the related law. This is attributed to the fact 
that in most instances where accomplice liability is appropriate, the courts have instead 
applied and developed common purpose.  
On a Kantian interpretative approach, the common purpose doctrine violates a number of 
rights that cannot be justified by the instrumental argument of crime control. Furthermore, the 
significance placed on less restrictive means and the existence thereof to common purpose 
intensifies the submission that the doctrine of common purpose unreasonably and 
unjustifiability limits an accused’s rights to dignity, presumption of innocence, freedom and 
security of person, and equality. Ramraj provides an apt conclusion to the balance that must 
be struck between the factors comprising the limitation analysis when the limitation of rights 
is premised on the purpose of crime control:  
A high rate of crime is, of course, serious and in some extreme cases may well threaten the 
very fabric of constitutional rights. However, the prevention of crime, as an admittedly crucial 
societal goal, is a multifaceted task involving, at the very least, a fair distribution of 
education, social wealth, self-esteem, and opportunity, which should not – and need not – be 
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Epitomising Fanon’s notion of ‘cognitive dissonance’, the CC, to protect the core belief that 
common purpose addresses the social need to control crime, appears to rationalise, ignore and 
even deny anything that does not fit in with the core belief by disregarding precedent
299
 and 
relying on instrumental arguments.
300
 This chapter has shown that the rights to dignity; 
presumption of innocence; freedom and security of person; and equality, are infringed by the 
application of the doctrine of common purpose. On a Kantian approach to the interpretation 
of the limitation of rights, the limitation of these rights is unjustifiable, as the purpose of the 
limitation, namely crime control, is disproportionate to the infringement of the rights. 
Furthermore, the existence of less restrictive alternative means of achieving the desired crime 
control benefits of the doctrine, tips the balance in favour of the finding that the doctrine 
unreasonably and unjustifiably infringes the aforementioned rights. 
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This chapter focuses on the relation between the principles of criminal law and the doctrine 
of common purpose. It commences with a discussion of the doctrine’s adherence to the 
fundamental principle of legality. The ius certum principle forms the main focus, as the 
concept of ‘active association’ and the defence of dissociation suggest a level of vagueness 
indicative of a violation of the principle of legality. Thereafter, a close scrutiny follows the 
court’s normative justification for the imputation of causation in common purpose by prior 
agreement and in its active association form. This chapter then details the problems 
associated with the assessment of fault in common purpose cases. First, the problems raised 
by the judgment in Nkwenja,
1
 which considers the moment mens rea is assessed, is 
elucidated. Secondly, the court’s process of inferential reasoning to establish dolus eventualis 
in common purpose cases is scrutinised. The chapter closes with an analysis of the 
effectiveness of the defences of mistake as to the causal sequence and mistake of law to limit 
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3.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: VOID FOR VAGUENESS  
 
3.2.1 Background 
The principle of legality, which forms part of the rule of law, is guaranteed by s 35(3)(l-n) of 
the Constitution. The principle of legality declares that “punishment may only be inflicted for 
contraventions of a clearly defined crime created by a law that was in force before the 
contravention”.
2
 The principle of legality encompasses five sub-principles.
3
 However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, only the ius certum principle will be scrutinised, as the vagueness of 
the doctrine of common purpose suggests an inconsistency with this sub-principle. 
The ius certum principle provides that common-law crimes must be clearly defined. The 
principle negatively phrased provides that common-law crimes that are vague and unclear 




 detailing the doctrine of vagueness, Madlanga 
J cites Ngcobo J in Affordable Medicines:
6
 
The doctrine of vagueness is founded on the rule of law, which…is a foundational value of 
our constitutional democracy. It requires that laws must be written in a clear and accessible 
manner. What is required is reasonable certainty and not perfect lucidity… The law must 
indicate with reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it what is required of them so 
that they may regulate their conduct accordingly.
7
 
Madlanga J and Ngcobo J’s interpretation of the ius certum principle mimics the English law 
principle of maximum certainty
8
 and the US void for vagueness principle. The US Supreme 
Court emphasised “a law which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 




 Cloete J 
noted the appellant’s reliance on Canadian cases,
11
 wherein the Canadian Supreme Court 
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considered vagueness by addressing two issues: (i) is the law so vague that it does not qualify 
as “a limit prescribed by law” –the test is whether the law provides “an intelligible standard 
according to which the judiciary must do its work”; and (ii) is it so imprecise that it is not a 
reasonable limit? 
It is submitted that the doctrine of common purpose, specifically the requirement of active 
association and the concept of dissociation, violates the ius certum principle, as both the 
requirement of active association and concept of dissociation fail to elucidate what is required 
with reasonable certainty. The ensuing chapter details the requirement of active association 
and the concept of dissociation, noting the court’s vague interpretation and the vacillating 
application thereof.  
3.2.2 ‘Active association’  
The doctrine of common purpose in the form of active association violates the principle of 
legality, as the requirement of ‘active association’ is inherently vague.
12
 Despite the existence 
of the Mgedezi requirements that establish active association, the development of the 
requirement of active association evinces the courts’ continuous inconsistent application of 
the factors that constitute the establishment of a participant’s active association in the 
common purpose.  
In Williams,
13
 the AD distinguished between a perpetrator and an accomplice, whereby the 
concepts of “association” and “help” were likened with the role of an accomplice.
14
 However, 




 Botha AJA latched on to the 
undefined concept of association mentioned in Williams, whereby his minority judgment 
introduced the notion of replacing the causal requirement with the concept of actively 
associating with the commission of the common purpose.
17
 Six years later, Botha JA in 
Safatsa,
18
 expanded on his minority judgment in Khoza. The requirement of a causal nexus 
was replaced with the requirement of ‘active association’. However, Botha JA failed to detail 
the concept of ‘active association’ in Safatsa, merely confirming that a causal nexus was not 
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required. Botha JA professed the vagueness of the concept of ‘active association’ and 
justified its usage by comparing it with the potential vagueness of psychological causation: 
[T]he adherence to the requirement of a causal connection between the conduct of the latter 
person and the death of the deceased would necessitate stretching the concept of causation, 
inter alia by resorting to the device of ‘psychological causation’, to such unrealistic limits as 
to border on absurdity. In the process there would be present a greater measure of vagueness 
and uncertainty than in regard to the application of the test of active association with the 
attainment of the common purpose. In any event, I do not think that the application of the 
latter tests presents unmanageable problems.
19
 
Botha JA’s justification was later criticised in the academic condemnation that followed the 
Safatsa judgment.
20
 Nevertheless, one year later in Mgedezi,
21
 Botha JA infused the decision 
in Safatsa with Professor Whiting’s active association requirements,
22
 thus entrenching the 
doctrine of common purpose by active association into South African law. The requirements 
of the doctrine of common purpose by active association, or the Mgedezi requirements as 
referred to in subsequent case law, have been constitutionally endorsed in Thebus.
23
  
The CC has asserted that the establishment of active association depends on the satisfaction 
of the factual context of each case to the Mgedezi requirements.
24
 These may provide a 
rebuttal against the argument that active association is vague. However, this rebuttal is 
baseless for two reasons. First, one of the Mgedezi requirements, specifically the 
manifestation of a sharing of a common purpose (the fourth Mgedezi requirement) fails to 
indicate with reasonable certainty what is required of a participant to actively associate with 
the commission of the crime. It is submitted that the highly criticised judgments of Safatsa, 
Nzo, and Thebus may be partly attributed to the vagueness of the fourth Mgedezi requirement.  
In Safatsa, accused 4 encouraged the crowd by shouting that the Deputy Mayor should be 
killed and slapped another woman who attempted to intercede for the deceased Deputy 
Mayor. Similar to Cameron’s
25
 contentions, there was no proof indicating that accused 4 
manifested a sharing of a common purpose, as her conduct could not be deemed to be in 
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association with the conduct of those who killed the Deputy Mayor.
26
 Cameron submits that 
accused 4’s conduct could not even be said to have incited or instigated or encouraged the 
deeds of the actual killers, thus satisfaction of the fourth Mgedezi requirement is 
implausible.
27
 Nevertheless, the court, given the unrestricted freedom to interpret the factual 
scenario afforded by the vagueness of the fourth Mgedezi requirement, convicted accused 4 
of murder. Sisilana argues that the phrase “conduct of others” in the fourth Mgedezi 
requirement is especially vague, as the conduct may refer to anything that the other accused 
did or conduct that forms the conduct element of the crime charged.
28
 On the latter 
interpretation, accused no 7’s conduct did not constitute an act of association, as his conduct 
was not consistent with murder.
29
 
Similarly, Burchell criticises the judgment in Thebus on the basis that active association was 
not proven. Burchell submits that the court in Thebus sacrificed legal principles in favour of 
crime control. He argues: 
On the evidence in Thebus, joining the protesting group and either carrying a pick handle (if 
appellant 1’s alibi is rejected) or holding a gun (but not witnessed shooting it) and collecting 
spent cartridges after the shots have been fired, is not sufficient active association to render 
the appellants co-perpetrators in the murder of an innocent bystander.
30
 
Once again, the ill-defined fourth Mgedezi requirement allowed the court to interpret the 
evidence in such a way that even in the absence of evidence, the fourth Mgedezi requirement 
could be satisfied. The judgment in Nzo evinces another chilling instance where the 
vagueness of the Mgedezi requirements was abused.  
In Nzo, there was no evidence that the appellants, although being active members in the 
campaign of the ANC, manifested a sharing of a common purpose with Joe’s conduct of 
murdering Mrs T. The unrestricted freedom to interpret the factual scenario so as to satisfy 
the Mgedezi requirements permitted Hefer JA to reject the appellants’ argument, holding: 
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Their design was to wage a localised campaign of terror and destruction; and it was in the 
furtherance of this design and for the preservation of the unit and the protection of each of its 
members that the murder was committed.
31
 
Hefer JA noted further that “there is no logical distinction between a common design relating 
to a particular offence and one relating to a series of offences”.
32
 Steyn JA’s dissenting 
judgment must be noted, as it acknowledges the wide ambit of common purpose amplified by 
the vagueness of the Mgedezi requirements. Steyn JA held that a broad, overarching common 
purpose to commit sabotage cannot warrant a conviction for murder.
33
 Burchell’s criticism of 
the judgment cogently captures the problem with the Mgedezi requirements and the 
application thereof:  
According to the prerequisites laid down by Botha JA in Mgedezi, presence at the scene of the 
killing would be required for the common-purpose principle, of imputing the acts of the 
perpetrator to the other parties to the common purpose, to apply. However, in Nzo, neither the 
first nor the second appellant was proved to be present when Joe killed the deceased. 
Furthermore, the conclusion reached by Hefer JA that the common-purpose principle can be 
invoked against the second appellant in order to find him guilty of murder, runs contrary to 
two further requirements laid down by Botha JA in Mgedezi. There was insufficient evidence 
to draw an inference of an intention on the part of the second appellant (or the first appellant, 
for that matter) to make common cause ‘with those who were actually perpetrating the 
assault’ and there was no manifestation of a sharing of a common purpose with the 




The criticism levelled by Burchell brings to light the devastating effects that the vague 
Mgedezi requirements can have when a court enjoys the unfettered interpretative freedom to 
establish a participant’s active association.
35
 However, advocates of the doctrine rely on 
Alkema J’s judgment in Mzwempi,
36
 wherein the meaning of the fourth Mgedezi requirement 
was elucidated, to clarify the vagueness of the requirement.  
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Alkema J held that the conduct referred to in the fourth Mgedezi requirement is restricted to 
particular conduct and not to any conduct.
37
 Alkema J noted that in the judgments of Safatsa, 
Mgedezi, Nzo and Thebus, the court interpreted the conduct in the fourth Mgedezi 
requirement as conduct that caused the ultimate unlawful consequence.
38
 However, Alkema 
J’s submission ignores the aforementioned academic criticism levelled against these 
judgments, whereby even on Alkema J’s interpretation of the conduct referred to in the fourth 
Mgedezi requirement, the requirement is not satisfied.  
The second rebuttal against the claim that the existence of the Mgedezi requirements 
negatives the vagueness of active association rests on the qualifications that have undergone 
common purpose by active association both pre- and post-Thebus’ Constitutional 
endorsement. Courts have vacillated between the factors that constitute active association. 
One such factor is the presence at the scene of the commission of the crime, where the AD in 
Yelani,
39
 per Smalberger JA, qualified one of the Mgedezi requirements, holding that 
presence at the scene where the commission of the crime took place was not an immutable 
requirement for liability under the common purpose doctrine. In Sibeko,
40
 the SCA stated that 





 the AD asserted that association with the common 
purpose can be established by an accused’s act after the death of the victim. Furthermore, the 
court held that an accused’s act after the death of the victim can be used as an inference of the 
accused’s intention in the form of dolus eventualis.
43
 However, in Mbanyaru,
44
 the full bench 
of the Cape High Court failed to consider the AD’s extension of common purpose in 
Petersen, holding that the second appellant’s act of running away with the first appellant after 
the fatal shooting cannot be inferred as constituting an ‘active association’.
45
  
The SCA’s judgment in Dewnath
46
 attempted to detail the proper application of the Mgedezi 
requirements, holding (i) there must be a close proximity in fact between the conduct 
considered to be active association and the result; and (ii) such active association must be 
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significant and not a limited participation removed from the actual execution of the crime.
47
 
The judgment, although arguably seeking to correct the vagueness of the requirement of 
active association, falls victim to the very thing they are seeking to rectify. The SCA failed to 
accurately define both qualifications to the Mgedezi requirements. Furthermore, the SCA’s 
judgment failed to juxtapose the Dewnath qualifications with the developments of the 
Mgedezi requirements. One such juxtaposition relates to the judgment in Yelani. It remains 
unclear whether the non-obligatory Mgedezi requirement of presence at the scene could 
satisfy the Dewnath qualifications, as it hardly seems likely that a participant who is not 
present on the scene can be considered to have actively associated to a significant extent and 
the participant’s conduct to be in close proximity with the result.  
Moseneke J’s assertion that the requirement of active association depends on the facts of each 
case delineates the inherent vagueness of the requirement, even when interpreted by South 
Africa’s highest court.
48
 The development of the requirement illustrates the unreasonableness 
and impossibility expected of a participant to understand, appreciate and direct his actions 
towards the realisation of actively associating in the common purpose. A participant’s 
understanding and appreciation are only seemingly determined after a court interprets the 
factual scenario, whereby the vagueness of the court’s interpretation has the possible counter-
effect of exacerbating the participant’s and future participant’s lack of understanding and 
appreciation. Despite the CC confirming the Mgedezi requirements in Thebus, the 
developments thereof are ignored. Thus, it is uncertain whether the requirement of presence 
at the scene as necessitated in Mgedezi, or rendered non-obligatory as in Yelani, represents 
the current law pertaining to active association. Furthermore, the SCA’s failure to accurately 
define the Dewnath qualifications exacerbates the confusion when juxtaposing the 
qualifications with the developments of the Mgedezi requirements. In effect, a court would 
enjoy the freedom to interpret the factual scenario in light of the Dewnath qualifications in a 
way that appropriates crime control. 
Advocates of the doctrine of common purpose would argue that the concept of dissociation 
serves as a reasonable limit of the requirement of active association, thus negating the 
imprecision of the doctrine. However, the defence of dissociation manifests a similar 
vagueness to the requirement of active association. 
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3.2.3 Dissociation from a common purpose 
Dissociation from a common purpose negates the accused’s participation in a common 
purpose. However, the development of dissociation and its present articulation manifests a 
similar vagueness to the aforementioned requirement of active association. In order to 
ascertain the current law on dissociation, a reflection of the development of the defence is 
necessary. The reflection captures Snyman’s commentary on the matter, whereby “South 
African courts have not yet developed very specific rules relating to the circumstances in 
which withdrawal will effectively terminate a participant’s liability”.
49
 The development of 
the defence, coupled with Snyman’s postulations on the matter, supports the submission that 




 Lewis JP held that a conspirator can withdraw from the joint enterprise at the 
last moment and the conspirator must merely attempt to frustrate the plan. However, in 
Ndebu,
51
 the court submitted that an effective dissociation entails the accused informing his 
companions of a change in intent and an attempt to change the intent of the companions. In 
Nomakhlala,
52
 the AD, per Grosskopf JA, asserted that the State must prove that the accused 
persisted in the execution of the common purpose. Accordingly, the court held that the 
accused’s withdrawal from the scene of the crime, coupled with his refusal to comply with an 
instruction to stab the deceased amounted to an effective dissociation from the common 
purpose.
53
 The fact that the accused was unaware of the true intention of the actual 





 the AD accepted the first appellant’s defence of dissociation, as he voluntarily 
disclosed his and his colleagues’ involvement in ANC activities before the murder was 
committed. In Beahan,
56
 Gubbay CJ described the rule of dissociation:  
Where a person has merely conspired with others to commit a crime but has not commenced 
an overt act towards the successful completion of that crime, a withdrawal is effective upon 
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timely and unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of the decision to abandon the 
common unlawful purpose. Where, however, there has been participation in a more 
substantial manner something further than communication to the co-conspirators of the 






 Grosskopf JA detailed the tests to be applied for an accused to effectively 
dissociate from the common purpose. The court distinguished the aforementioned South 
African and Zimbabwean authority as it pertained to common purpose by prior agreement. 
Accordingly, Grosskopf JA, stressing the requirements for liability, being intention and an 
active association with the conduct of the others for the attainment of the common purpose, 
held that effective dissociation depends on either of the above requirements being 
unfulfilled.
59
 The court expounded on the test for dissociation, stating:  
The test for dissociation will often be difficult to apply, but ultimately it is a question of fact 
and evidence. The accused starts with the problem that, ex hypothesi, he was an active 
participant in the common purpose, and a court may well be skeptical of his avowal of 
abjuration. Nevertheless here, as elsewhere, the onus is on the prosecution.
60
 
Grosskopf JA noted further that the accused’s change in intent is not dependent on moral 
considerations, but purely a factual inquiry.
61
 The accused’s withdrawal from the scene after 
being injured himself would factor into the factual inquiry. Furthermore, it is not decisive that 
the accused communicated his change in intent.
62
 The evidentiary accumulation of the factual 




 Nienaber JA neither relied on Gubbay CJ’s dictum in Beahan nor confirmed it as 
a rule of South African law. Instead, the Court held that despite the accused’s lack of 
presence at the scene of the crime, the fact that the accused was a party to the planning of the 
robbery, coupled with his conduct of being a lookout, accompanying the robbers and 
knowing that weapons would be taken along and might be used, the defence of dissociation 
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whereby the accused’s “conduct after the robbery showed that he remained a willing 





 Comrie AJA asserted that whether an act constitutes an effective dissociation 
depends on: the manner and degree of an accused’s participation; how far the commission of 
the crime has proceeded; the manner and timing of disengagement; and in some instances, on 
what steps the accused took or could have taken to prevent the commission or completion of 
the crime. Furthermore, Comrie AJA introduced the notion of likening dissociation with the 
omissio per commissionem principle.
69
 The court concluded: 
  The authorities
70
 indicate, in my view, that on a practical level the courts of several countries, 
including South Africa, proceed from this premise: That the greater the accused's participation, 
and the further the commission of the crime has progressed, then much more will be required of 
an accused to constitute an effective disassociation. He may even be required to take steps to 
prevent the commission of the crime or its completion. It is in this sense a matter of degree and 
in a borderline case calls for a sensible and just value judgment.
71
 
Comrie AJA argues that the defence of dissociation should not be reduced to a rule of law, as 
the factors constituting an effective dissociation are not exhaustive. Comrie AJA’s argument 
directly feeds into the problem underlying the defence of dissociation. The lack of a credible, 
well-defined concept of dissociation inhibits a participant’s attempt to dissociate from the 
common purpose. Snyman articulates the factors that favour a defence of dissociation, but the 
factors are so vaguely defined that an accused who adamantly seeks to negative liability, may 
still be held liable. First, a participant must have a clear intention to dissociate from the 
common purpose or not actively associate in the common purpose.
72
 However, a participant’s 
ability to not actively associate, and thus constitute a defence of dissociation, is severely 
limited by the inherent vagueness of the requirement of active association discussed above.  
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Secondly, the participant must perform some positive act of dissociation. The positive act has 
been interpreted as: a communication of dissociation that may or may not need to dissuade 
the other participants;
73
 frustrating the commission of the crime;
74
 leaving the presence of the 
crime.
75
 The extent of the participant’s positive act depends on the participant’s role in the 
common purpose. A participant who is heavily involved in the common purpose must exhibit 
some positive act beyond that required of a less involved participant. In effect, a participant, 
whether heavily involved in the common purpose or not, may never truly appreciate whether 
his actions constitute an effective dissociation, until the court provides an armchair subjective 




A counter argument against the ill-defined requirement of active association and the defence 
of dissociation would rely on Madlanga J’s judgment in Savoi. Madlanga J considered the 
doctrine of vagueness from the perspective of knowledge of unlawfulness, as explicated by 
the AD in De Blom:
77
 
A person only acts dolo malo when he acts unlawfully with full knowledge that he is doing 
so. This does not mean the wrongdoer must know that he is contravening section W of Act X 
of 19YZ, or that the wrongdoer must know that what he intends doing is punishable with this 
or that punishment, but only that he must be aware of the fact that what he intends doing is 
unlawful. This does also not mean that the wrongdoer must know for sure that what he 
intends doing is unlawful, but only that he must have realised that what he intends doing 
could possibly be unlawful and that he has reconciled himself with this possibility.
78
 
The doctrine of vagueness assessed in the context of knowledge of unlawfulness coincides 
with the thin-ice principle of English law. The thin-ice principle, introduced by Lord 
Morris,
79
 holds that “citizens who know that their conduct is on the borderline of illegality 
take the risk that their behaviour will be held to be criminal”.
80
 Ashworth rejects the thin-ice 
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principle, as it violates the principle of autonomy, and punishes and stigmatises individuals 
for conduct unclearly defined.
81
 
An application of the test applied for the requirement of active association and the defence of 
dissociation to the Canadian Supreme Court’s prescribed test for vague laws reinforces the 
claim of vagueness. The requirement of active association and the defence of dissociation 
requires the judiciary to “do the work” of interpreting whether the conduct of the participant 
constitutes active association and whether the dissociation constitutes effective dissociation.
82
 
The determination of active association upon the factual context of each case, coupled with 
the vacillating judgments means that the doctrine is so imprecise that it fails to set a 
reasonable limit.
83
 The limit is arguably achieved by the availability of the defence of 
dissociation, but the court’s freedom to make a value judgment pertaining to the defence 
ultimately entails that a participant may only understand and appreciate his conduct upon an 
ex post facto interpretation by the court. 
Snyman concludes that the current propositions on dissociation “are a fair reflection of our 
law on this subject”.
84
 Perhaps Snyman is correct, as our law on this subject, namely common 
purpose in its active association form, reflects the vagueness of the defence of dissociation –
laws that fail to indicate with reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it what is 
















 Snyman op cit (n3) at 263. 
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3.3 A NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCTRINE’S DEROGATION OF A 
CAUSAL NEXUS 
 
3.3.1 Introduction  
The development of the causation requirement in common purpose cases presents two 
distinct justifications for the imputation of causation in cases of common purpose by prior 
agreement and in its active association form respectively, namely: mandate and the fulfilment 
of the Mgedezi requirements.
85
 This chapter is aimed at assessing the court’s two distinct 
normative justifications for the imputation of causation. First, the mandate justification is 
scrutinised against the three approaches it encompasses: mandate as authorisation; mandate 
as power of control and; mandate as contributory cause. Thereafter, this chapter challenges 
the satisfaction of the Mgedezi requirements as a justification for the imputation of causation 
in common purpose in its active association form. The challenge focuses on the vagueness of 
the Mgedezi requirements, specifically the fourth Mgedezi requirement, as well as the 
significance the court attaches to the collective mind or entity. This thesis reveals that the two 
distinct normative justifications do not constitute an unassailable basis for the imputation of 
causation, especially in light of the constitutional violation that ensues therefrom. Thus, the 
only remaining possible justification for the imputation of causation is the utilitarian rationale 
of crime control. 
3.3.2 Normative justifications 
Roman-Dutch law founded liability for participation in a crime on the concept of mandate, 
which was premised on the maxim ‘qui facit per alium facit per se’.
86
 Rabie contends that the 
concept of mandate refers to quasi-mandate, as an unlawful mandate is not valid.
87
 The 
Transvaal Supreme Court’s reference to the term ‘socius criminis’ in Peerkhan and Lalloo 
supports Rabie’s contention, as the term suggests the mandate arising from the operation of 
law, rather than from authorisation.
88
 The introduction of English law, and its importation of 
the doctrine of common purpose through the Native Territories Penal Code seemingly saw a 
change in rationale for culpability. However, Innes CJ’s minority judgment in McKenzie 
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recognised the doctrine as being premised on the doctrine of implied mandate.
89
  
Grounding the imputation of causation of common purpose by prior agreement on the 
principles of implied mandate remained the underlying justification, but throughout the 




The development of common purpose led to its extension to include the distinct form of 
‘active association’. This distinct form of common purpose did not involve an agreement, 
nullifying the possible justification grounded in the notion of implied mandate. Botha JA’s 
judgment in Safatsa, wherein the distinct form of common purpose by ‘active association’ 
was formulated, considered the justification for the imputation of causation, holding that “the 




Similarly, the development of common purpose in its active association form bore no 
reference to a normative justification for the imputation of causation. The CC in Thebus 
however, professed two rationales for common purpose. The first rationale was founded on 
the object to “criminalise collective criminal conduct and thus to satisfy the social need to 
control crime committed in the course of joint enterprises”.
92
 Secondly, the imputation of 
causation was premised on the notion that the requirement of causation would “render the 
object of the doctrine nugatory and ineffectual and make prosecution of collaborative 
criminal enterprise intractable and ineffectual”.
93
 Evidently, the CC failed to provide a 
normative justification for the imputation of causation, instead favouring an instrumental 
utilitarian justification of crime control.
94
  
Drawing heavily on the works of Lwandile Sisilana
95
 and David Unterhalter,
96
 who provide 
the foremost normative critique against the doctrine, this thesis will scrutinise the notion of 
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implied mandate as a justification for the imputation of causation in common purpose by 
prior agreement cases. Thereafter, the normative rationale underlying the distinct form of 
common purpose by active association will be challenged.  
The doctrine of causation does not provide a normative justification for attributing liability 
for the acts of another,
97
 as Unterhalter argues:  
This limitation is integral to the criminal law’s respect for persons as sovereign actors whose 
volitional action is freely chosen and not determined. When B acts as he does, the criminal 
law must treat that action as chosen by B, and therefore as B’s action alone, or it fails to 
respect him as a sovereign person. The doctrine of causation cannot make A liable for the 
volitional action of B, because as Hart and Honore have pointed out, B’s chosen action is a 
barrier through which the causal inquiry cannot penetrate.
98
  
The doctrine of common purpose however, allows for the attribution of liability for the acts 
of another. The imputation of causation from the principal perpetrator to the participants in 
the common purpose gives effect to this attribution of liability. Thus, a normative 
justification for the imputation of causation is necessary. Snyman submits that the basis of the 
doctrine lies in the concept of implied mandate.
99
 Walker argues that the notion of implied 
mandate encompasses three distinct approaches, namely: mandate as authorisation; mandate 
as power of control; and mandate as contributory cause, which may distinctly afford a 
normative justification for the imputation of causation.
100
  
Mandate as authorisation entails the participant in a common purpose expressly or tacitly 
authorising the principal perpetrator’s unlawful conduct.
101
 Mandate as power of control 
considers the power of control that the participant exercises over the principal perpetrator’s 
conduct.
102
 Thus, mandate as authorisation and mandate as power of control are not distinct, 
as they are both derivatives of the notion of implied perpetration, which is expressed in the 
‘per alium’ maxim.
103
 Unterhalter supports the imputation of causation being based on 
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mandate as authorisation and as power of control, principally in instances whereby an 
individual consents to be bound by the actions of another, arguing: 
One person is only responsible for the actions of another if he plainly adopts them as his own. 
Adoption must be informed choice over which the individual has control; it is this consent to 
be bound that links another’s actions to the sovereign will of the individual for which he may 
justifiably be held accountable…Thus I submit that, save where the individual consents to be 
bound, there is no basis for attributing the actions of one person to another consistent with the 
respect the law affords the separateness of persons.
104
  
Mandate as authorisation and mandate as power of control may provide a normative 
justification for the imputation of causation, however, this justification is assailable for two 
reasons. First, mandate as authorisation and as power of control cannot justify the application 
of common purpose by prior agreement where that agreement is implied.
105
 Sisilana argues: 
[I]n so voluntarily assuming each others’ conduct, we have exercised our autonomy. And if 
that is the case – if agreement is predicated on autonomy –then that is reason enough to think 
common purpose by agreement perfectly acceptable…It could however, be argued that 
agreement is not, in se, sufficient for criminal liability, for there is an important principle of 
which common purpose by agreement falls foul– the principle of causation. So that if we are 
to say that agreement is sufficient for the purposes of liability, there must be a characteristic 
in virtue of which it is superior to the principle of causation.
106
  
Sisilana submits that agreement acts as a connection between the participant and the ultimate 
unlawful consequence, but this connection “is not a causal one: it is one of aligning oneself 
with the act that causes the prohibited consequence”.
107
 Furthermore, agreement does not 
constitute a strong enough connection, as Sisilana holds that the actual basis for the 
imputation of causation is both agreement and foresight.
108
 Sisilana utilises an example to 
support his submission: parties agree to rob a bank, and not to kill anybody in the process, but 
the parties do foresee (without discussion thereof) that one of the members of the party, who 
is armed might, on resistance, shoot and kill the resisting person. In this example, on the 
application of common purpose, the parties would be liable for murder. Sisilana validly asks: 
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“what do we make of the fact that killing doesn’t form part of what was agreed upon?”
109
 He 




[I]t is an important fact that killing is specifically excluded from the agreement; and there is, 
therefore, no warrant to say that there was a tacit agreement that the other party should kill. 
So the basis for the parties’ liability in this robbery case is not tacit agreement. It seems to me 




The fundamental problem of attribution devoid of a proper connection, being agreement, is 
accurately captured by Unterhalter’s warning:  
Attribution which does not connect to the individual’s voluntary assumption of responsibility 
for the actions of another amounts to an imposition by way of legal imputation for action 
blameworthy neither for its harmful consequences nor for its willed adoption. Such an 
imposition is a gratuitous invasion of individual freedom.
112 
The second reason assailing the concept of mandate as a justification for the imputation of 
causation pertains to the fact that mandate as authorisation and as power of control fails to 
account for the imputation of causation from the principal perpetrator to a participant whose 
contribution was insignificant.
113
 A participant who played a minor or even no contributory 
role to the ultimate unlawful consequence cannot be said to have authorised or exercised 
control over the principal perpetrator’s conduct.  
De Wet interprets an additional approach to the mandate analogy, whereby mandate as 
contributory cause may provide the necessary normative justification for the imputation of 
causation. Mandate as contributory cause reflects the understanding of ‘psychological 
causation’, as it entails that a participant, through his mandate, being held liable propter 
mandatum for setting into motion a causal sequence of events.
114
 However, Botha JA rejected 
the concept of ‘psychological causation’ in Safatsa, holding that it would stretch the concept 
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of causation to such unrealistic limits as to border on absurdity.
115
 Walker submits that Botha 
JA’s rejection was influenced by Hart and Honore, whereby they argued that “because human 
beings have independent volition, it can never be correct to speak of any person as having 
caused another’s voluntary act and that, consequently, it is not permissible to attribute 
responsibility for one person’s voluntary act to another on the principle of causation”.
116
 
Kadish provides a rebuttal against Botha JA’s rejection of the concept of ‘psychological 
causation’, holding that a participant’s act of causing the principal perpetrator to act is not 
based on the cause in the strict, scientific sense, but on a participant’s ability to influence the 
principal perpetrator’s voluntary act.
117
 Kadish notes that a participant’s liability will be 
dependent on the influence exerted being deliberate.
118
 Similarly, mandate as contributory 
cause cannot justify the imputation of causation to a participant who played a minor or even 
no contributory role, as the participant cannot be said to have influenced the principal 
perpetrator’s commission of the ultimate unlawful consequence.  
Mandate as authorisation, or power of control, or contributory cause, fails to provide a 
normative justification for the imputation of causation in cases of common purpose by prior 
agreement. In cases of common purpose in its active association form, a possible justification 
for the imputation of causation cannot be based on the concept of mandate, as agreement does 
not comprise this distinct form of common purpose. A normative justification must thus exist 
elsewhere.  
The normative justification for common purpose in its active association form is based on the 
satisfaction of the Mgedezi requirements.
119
 Sisilana argues that the success of the 
justification depends on whether these requirements respect the principle of causation or 
not.
120
 There are two noteworthy critiques against the Mgedezi requirements serving as an 
appropriate normative justification for the imputation of causation. First, as previously 
discussed, the requirements of active association are vague, amounting to a violation of the 
principle of legality, specifically the ius certum principle.
121
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Secondly, active association ignores the concept of methodological individualism, instead 
treating an individual’s actions as a product of a collective mind or entity.
122
 Botha JA’s 
judgment in Safatsa exemplifies such a flaw, whereby he asserts that the accused shared a 
common purpose to kill the deceased with the mob as a whole.
123
 Unterhalter captures the 
problem of criminal laws devoid of methodological individualism: 
We either blame individuals for their actions or we do not attribute blame at all. The criminal 
law must always guard against reasoning on the basis of corporate blame. Consequences 
come about through individual actions and must be blamed upon individual actors either on 
the basis of what their actions bring about or derivatively on the basis of the actions which 
may properly be attributed to them.
124
 
The significance attached to a collective mind or entity is further emphasised in instances 
where the identity of the principal perpetrator is unknown.
125
 The application of the doctrine 
in this instance attributes the actions of the collective entity to the participants to the common 
purpose, thus ignoring the fundamental principle of ‘methodological individualism’.  
In conclusion, the concept of mandate and the fulfilment of the Mgedezi requirements cannot 
provide an unassailable normative justification for the imputation of causation in common 
purpose cases by prior agreement or in its active association form. The lack of a proper 
justification bolsters the constitutional arguments in this thesis, as the violation that ensues 
from the derogation of a causal nexus, specifically the infringement of the right to be 
presumed innocent, is not based on a credible normative justification.
126
 The only possible 
remaining justification for the imputation of causation is the utilitarian rationale of crime 
control. Walker’s assertion provides an apt conclusion to the assailable normative 
justifications for the imputation of causation:   
The lack of any normative basis for the doctrine is highly problematic, however. It flies in the 
face of decades of legal development and refinement, in which our courts have generally 
striven to approach the criminal law on a rational, systematic and principled basis. It means 
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that the doctrine of common purpose is an aberration, since it then represents the sole 
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3.4 FAULT OF COMMON PURPOSE 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The doctrine of common purpose does not impute the mens rea of the principal offender to all 
other participants in the common purpose.
128
 The State must prove that each accused had the 
necessary fault to be convicted of the specific offence.
129
 The doctrine thus involves an 
assessment of mens rea identical to the assessment of mens rea in instances where the 




 are sufficient 
forms of fault under the doctrine. The requirement of fault for each accused is argued to be a 
restraint on the ambit of liability of the doctrine.
132
 However, the assessment of fault under 
the doctrine raises notable problems. First, the judgment in Nkwenja,
133
 which considers the 
moment mens rea is assessed in common purpose cases, amounts to a revival of the versari in 
re illicita doctrine and violates the contemporaneity rule. Lastly, courts have failed to give 
effect to the cardinal rules for inferential reasoning delineated in Blom,
134
 resulting in the 
improper determination of the existence of dolus eventualis in common purpose cases. This 
chapter details these problems arising from the assessment of fault under the doctrine.  
3.4.2 The moment mens rea is assessed 
The AD’s judgment in Nkwenja serves as the seminal judgment on the moment mens rea is 
assessed in common purpose cases. The majority, per Jansen JA with Joubert JA and 
Grosskopf AJA concurring, held that a participant’s fault in common purpose cases is 
assessed at the time when the common purpose is created.
135
 In contrast, Rabie CJ with 
Miller JA concurring, held that a participant’s fault in a common purpose is assessed at the 
time when the principal perpetrator commits the unlawful conduct.
136
 Burchell has criticised 
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the majority judgment, arguing that the majority’s assessment of fault in common purpose 
cases revives the doctrine of versari in re illicita and violates the contemporaneity rule.
137
  
The doctrine of versari in re illicita, which is an exception to the contemporaneity rule, holds 
that a person who committed an unlawful act is criminally liable for all the consequences that 
followed.
138
 The application of the versari doctrine resulted in strict liability, as the state of 
mind of the accused in relation to the consequences of the accused’s act was immaterial. The 
AD had earlier rejected the versari doctrine, as it violated the principle of fault-based 
punishment.
139
 Burchell submits that, due to the majority judgment in Nkwenja ignoring a 
participant’s change in the mental state, the conviction amounts to ‘versari-type liability’.
140
  
In Nkwenja, the two appellants in a common purpose committed robbery. At the time the 
common purpose was formulated, the death of the deceased was reasonably foreseeable, but 
not foreseen. Contrastingly, at the time the deceased was killed, death was not foreseen and 
there was also reasonable doubt as to whether death was reasonably foreseen.
141
 
Nevertheless, the appellants were found guilty off culpable homicide, as death was 
reasonably foreseeable at the time the common purpose was formulated. Burchell comments 
as follows: 
If the death of the victim in Nkwenja had been caused by a single individual, not acting in 
concert with another, there would be no doubt that he would, on the evidence, have to be 
acquitted of culpable homicide and this conclusion would be borne out by the decision of the 
Appellate Division in Van As and Bernadus. Why should the participants in a common 







 the AD held that on a charge of culpable homicide, the State 
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in the position of the accused 
would have foreseen the possibility that death would occur. However, in Nkwenja, the 
majority’s assessment of fault at the time the common purpose was formulated disregards the 
change in an accused’s mental state, thus implanting the fictional reasonable person in the 
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position of the complainant also at the time the common purpose was formulated, as opposed 
to when the unlawful conduct occurred.
145
   
Courts have vacillated between the application of the majority and minority judgment in 
Nkwenja. Boister
146
 observes that in Mitchell,
147
 Nestadt JA assessed the mens rea of the 
second appellant to the common purpose at the time the first appellant (principal offender) 
threw the brick and killed the pedestrian.
148
 Nestadt JA disregarded the majority judgment in 
Nkwenja, instead following the minority judgment, whereby the fault of a participant in a 
common purpose was assessed when the principal offender committed the unlawful conduct 
of throwing the brick and killing the pedestrian.
149
 Contrastingly, in Munonjo,
150
 the trial 
court convicted the appellants of murder on the basis that when they had broken into the 
farmhouse to steal the keys to the deceased’s car and money for petrol, they already had 
formulated a common purpose to murder. However, the AD held that it had not been proved 
that the appellants subjectively foresaw the possibility of death and that there was 
consequently no basis upon which the appellants could have been convicted of murder. The 
AD’s decision was based on the application of the majority judgment in Nkwenja. The court 
reasoned that it could not be proved that the appellants foresaw that one of them would have 
disarmed the deceased who had the firearm and killed both the deceased. However, had the 
court applied the minority judgment of Nkwenja, the court would have accounted for the 
appellants’ change in mental state, which would have proven foresight.  
The decision in Munonjo reiterates the effect of the majority judgment in Nkwenja, whereby 
an application of the majority judgment can either benefit or disadvantage an accused. The 
CC in Thebus does seem to endorse the minority judgment of Nkwenja.
151
 However, Thebus 
concerned the doctrine of common purpose in its active association form, thus confining the 
assessment of mens rea to only one of the forms of common purpose.
152
 Nevertheless, the 
application of either the majority or minority judgment in Nkwenja poses a threat to the 
contemporaneity rule.  
                                                          
145
 A participant’s right to equality may be infringed, as a single individual, not acting in concert with another 
would instead be acquitted. 
146
 N Boister ‘Common Purpose: Association and Mandate’ (1992) 5 SACJ 167. 
147
 S v Mitchell 1992 (1) SACR 17 (A). 
148
 Ibid at 22g-h; Boister op cit (n146) at 169. 
149
 The minority judgment in Nkwenja was also supported in S v Dladla 2010 JDR 1021 (KZP). 
150
 S v Munonjo 1990 (1) SACR 360 (A). 
151
 Thebus supra (n23) paras 37 and 49. 
152
 Burchell op cit (n2) at 496.  
86 
 
The contemporaneity rule requires that where the definitional elements of the crime 
necessitate mens rea, the actus reus must exist contemporaneously with that mens rea before 
an accused can be criminally liable.
153
 An application of the majority judgment in Nkwenja 
would violate the contemporaneity rule, as the mens rea is assessed at the earlier time the 
common purpose was formulated, whilst the participant’s imputed actus reus is assessed at a 
later time when the principal perpetrator committed the ultimate unlawful consequence. The 
majority judgment presents an additional violation of the contemporaneity rule, similar to that 
of the minority judgment.  
The contemporaneity rule is premised on the dogma that the function of criminal law is not to 
judge an accused’s general behaviour over a period of time, but is rather concerned with the 
distinct criminal conduct charged.
154
 The doctrine of common purpose, applied using the 
majority or minority judgment, involves the imputation of the principle perpetrator’s actus 
reus to the other participants in the common purpose. The contemporaneity rule necessitates 
an assessment of the actus reus of the individual participant in order to establish whether the 
participant’s causal contribution co-existed with the requisite fault of the offence 
committed.
155
 However, the doctrine entails an assessment of the principal perpetrator’s actus 
reus, which is then imputed to the participant. The participant’s actus reus is not individually 
assessed, meaning there is no determination of whether the participant’s causal contribution 
existed contemporaneously with the requisite fault. 
3.4.3 Dolus eventualis and inferential reasoning  
Dolus eventualis is a sufficient form of fault when establishing the guilt of a participant in a 
common purpose.
156
 The AD’s judgment pertaining to dolus eventualis in common purpose 
instances has been applied with approval in all subsequent common purpose cases.
157
 In cases 
involving common purpose, courts utilise the process of inferential reasoning to determine 
the existence of dolus eventualis.
158
 However, the process of inferential reasoning poses 
significant problems, as the courts are able to justify fault based on trivial acts of association. 
Inferential reasoning was not generally improperly applied during apartheid, as a number of 
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cases displayed an exemplary application of the cardinal rules of inferential reasoning.
159
 
However, the infamous cases of Safatsa and Nzo highlight the problematic instances where 
the judiciary was able to ignore the cardinal rules in favour of crime control and the 
suppression of political uprising. A similar problem manifested post-apartheid, whereby the 
improper use of inferential reasoning could justify the establishment of the Mgedezi 
requirements.  
The AD in Blom
160
 established two cardinal rules for reasoning by inference in criminal 
cases. First, the inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proven facts: if it 
is not, the inference cannot be drawn. Secondly, the proven facts should be such that they 
exclude every reasonable inference from them save the one sought to be drawn: if these 
proven facts do not exclude all other reasonable inferences, then there must be a doubt 
whether the inference sought to be drawn is correct.
161
 Schmidt expands on the second rule in 
Blom, noting that the rule requires the exclusion of “any reasonable alternative 
hypothesis”.
162
 An additional caveat on the Blom rule is provided by the AD in Essack,
163
 




The application of the cardinal rules established in Blom serves as a necessary limitation 
when determining the existence of dolus eventualis. However, courts have failed to 
accurately give effect to the cardinal rules, instead, courts have adopted a crime control 
approach to inferential reasoning.
165
 The infamous cases of Safatsa and Nzo have been 
criticised due to the court’s improper inferential reasoning.  
In Safatsa, five of the accused were convicted of murder based on the testimony of 
eyewitnesses. However, the conviction against accused 3 was secured by the process of 
inferential reasoning. Accused 1, who was the first accused arrested for the murder of the 
Deputy Mayor, reported to the police the whereabouts of the pistol taken from the deceased. 
The police were directed to the home of accused 3, where they asked accused 3 if he knew 
about a pistol. Accused 3 answered affirmatively and handed the pistol, which was stored in 
his ceiling, to the police. Accused 3 denied involvement in the murder, and told the police 
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that he had obtained the pistol from a group of children who participated in the rioting on the 
day of the deceased’s murder. Later, accused 3 stated to a magistrate that he obtained the 
pistol from a group of children, but that it was obtained one day after the death of the 
deceased, thus denying the earlier statement made to the police. Accused 3 and accused 1 
could not provide any explanation as to why accused 1 was able to direct the police to the 
home of accused 3 where the pistol was retrieved. On the sum of this evidence, accused 3 
was sentenced to hang.  
Justice Edwin Cameron argued that there were at least three flaws in the court’s reasoning. 
The first flaw relates to the court’s failure to consider accused 3’s demeanour and actions 
towards the police.
166
 Cameron contends that the inference that accused 3 took the pistol 
based on his reactions to the police is inconsistent with the first rule in Blom.
167
 The trial 
court and the AD relied on the lie accused 3 told regarding how he came to be in possession 
of the pistol in order to convict accused 3. However, both courts failed to recognise that the 
proved facts included accused 3’s willing admission of possession of the pistol and handing it 
to the police. Furthermore, the courts ignored the fact that if accused 3 lied to absolve his 
participation in the murder, then why did accused 3 not deny possession of the pistol or 
conceal it? The second flaw pertains to both courts failing to account for the passing of 67 
days between the murder of the Deputy Mayor and the retrieval of the pistol from accused 3’s 
home.
168
 Cameron argues that the long passing of time gives rise to a number of ways in 
which accused 3 could have come to possess the pistol.
169
 Furthermore, Cameron submits 
that the fact that accused 3 was in possession of the pistol and accused 1 directed the police to 
accused 3’s home, merely proves that accused 1 knew that accused 3 was in possession of the 
pistol.
170
 The third flaw relates to the AD disregarding the precedent on untruthful accused.
171
 
Cameron argues that the lie told by accused 3 to the police is immaterial, as on a proper 




 the lie could have 
been told for a number of reasons incompatible with guilt.
174
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Burchell argues that the judgment in Nzo evinces another instance where the court exercised 
improper inferential reasoning.
175
 In Nzo, the trial court held that there was a common 
purpose “on the part of the terrorists and some accused to commit acts of sabotage” and that 
fatalities “must have been foreseen and by inference, were foreseen by the participants of that 
common purpose.”
176
 The trial court relied on the ANC pamphlets, which described 
informers as traitors and deserving of death, to draw an inference that the appellants foresaw 
the possibility that an informer, or possible informer, such as Mrs T, could be killed.
177
 On 
appeal, the appellants did not challenge this inference or the conclusion reached that they 
foresaw the possibility of Mrs T’s death. Burchell submits that there was insufficient 
evidence to draw an inference of an intention of the appellants to make common cause, as 
“subscribing to the overarching policies of an organisation is not and should not be sufficient 
to link members to the specific murder committed by another member.”
178
 A similar 
improper inference was drawn by the court in Thebus, whereby the court failed to consider 
other reasonable inferences for joining the protesting group, carrying a pick handle, holding a 
gun (but not witnessed shooting it), and retrieving spent cartridges.
179
 Hoffmann and 
Zeffertt’s academic caveat to the cardinal rules in Blom, also serves as a pertinent conclusion 
regarding the court’s tendency to draw improper inferences in common purpose cases: 
It sometimes happens that the trier of fact is so pleased at having thought of a theory to 
explain the facts that he may tend to overlook inconsistent circumstances or assume the 




The majority’s judgment in Nkwenja entails a departure from the fundamental principle of 
mens rea, whereby the required mens rea is inferred either from some less blameworthy state 
of mind or from the unlawful or immoral character of the act.
181
 Furthermore, on the adoption 
of either the majority or minority’s judgment in Nkwenja, the actus reus and the mens rea of 
a participant in a common purpose need not exist contemporaneously. A further problem 
exposed in this chapter relates to the court’s continuous improper inferential reasoning to 
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establish dolus eventualis in common purpose cases. The courts’ have allowed the need to 

























3.5 DEFENCE AGAINST COMMON PURPOSE  
 
3.5.1 Introduction  
The wide liability accrued under common purpose has come under criticism in a number of 
instances, whereby a limitation on the doctrine’s liability was demanded.
182
 Proponents argue 
that the law related to dissociation from the common purpose serves as a limitation of the 
liability under the doctrine. However, the vagueness of the defence of dissociation and, in 
many instances, the unavailability of the defence render the defence of dissociation weak.
183
 
Fortunately, there are two further possible defences that a participant may rely on to negate 
liability. First, the AD’s judgment in Goosen,
184
 regarding the defence of mistake as to the 
causal sequence, may limit liability in common purpose cases. Secondly, Grant’s theoretical 
defence of mistake of law in common purpose cases may provide an additional limitation on 
common purpose liability.
185
 This chapter discusses the effectiveness of the defences of 
mistake as to the causal sequence and mistake of law in common purpose cases, noting the  
problems associated with the defences. 
3.5.2 Mistake as to the causal sequence 
This chapter provides an exposition of the application of the Goosen-rule in subsequent 
common purpose cases to support Burchell’s claim that “the rule will serve as a valuable way 
of limiting liability in common purpose cases.”
186
 However, heeding Snyman’s articulation 
that “the courts, in subsequent cases in which there were strong possibilities that X was 
mistaken as to the causal chain of events, decided the matters without applying or even 
referring to the novel rule applied in Goosen”,
187
 the value of the defence of mistake as to the 
causal sequence diminishes.   
The legal question posed by Van Heerdan AJA in Nhlapo,
188
 “whether dolus 
eventualis requires foresight not only of a consequence but also of the causal sequence 
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leading to the consequence”,
189





 the AD, favouring German criminal theorists, answered the question, holding that 
“in a consequence crime, intention is lacking where an accused’s foresight of the causal 
sequence differs markedly from the actual causal sequence”.
192
 Van Heerdan JA discussed 
the Goosen-rule in relation to dolus. The AD held that where mens rea takes the form of 
dolus directus, an accused’s mistake as to the causal sequence is irrelevant, as the deviation 
between the accused’s foresight of the causal sequence and the actual causal sequence will 
not readily be regarded as material.
193
 Nevertheless, the AD noted the possibility of 
exceptions to this rule. Contrastingly, where mens rea takes the form of dolus eventualis, the 
AD held that an accused’s mistake as to the causal sequence will negative criminal 
liability.
194
 The AD addressed the question as to “how the line is to be drawn between 
deviations excluding intention and those not having that effect.”
195
 Van Heerdan JA asserted 
that foresight of the precise manner in which the actual sequence occurred is not required. 
Instead, Van Heerdan submitted that a marked or material difference exists where the 
deviation between the actual and foreseen sequence differs to such an extent that it cannot 
reasonably be said that the accused envisaged the actual sequence.
196
 Van Heerden JA left the 
explication of the guidelines of the ‘material deviation’ test to courts.
197
  
In Goosen, the AD set aside the appellant’s conviction of murder under common purpose, as 
the actual death of Mr Marais by Mr Mazibuko involuntarily discharging his firearm was not 
foreseen by the appellant. However, the appellant was found guilty of culpable homicide, as a 
reasonable person in the position of the appellant would have foreseen the possibility of death 
resulting from involuntarily discharging the firearm. The application of the Goosen-rule in 
common purpose cases was later developed by the AD in Mitchell.
198
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In Mitchell, the two appellants and two other teenagers agreed to throw stones at pedestrians 
from the back of a moving Landrover vehicle.
199
 However, appellant 1 collected a brick, 
which he threw at a group of pedestrians. The brick struck and killed a pedestrian. Nestadt JA 
held that appellant 1’s throwing of the brick that caused the death fell outside the ambit of the 
common purpose of throwing stones.
200
 The court asserted that there was a marked difference 
of the size and consequences between the brick and the stones.
201
 Furthermore, the court 
accepted the evidence that the second appellant did not foresee that the first appellant would 
throw the brick and kill someone.
202
 Therefore, the second appellant did not have requisite 
mens rea and was acquitted of murder. The court then considered whether the second 
appellant’s association in a common purpose to throw stones could warrant a conviction of 
assault for the first appellant throwing a brick.
203




[T]he liability of parties to a common purpose depends on whether the result produced by the 
perpetrator of the act falls within the mandate and is not concerned with the means by which 
the result is produced.
205
 
Greenberg JA’s judgment in Shezi seemingly serves as a limitation of the Goosen-rule. 
However, Nestadt JA held that the Goosen-rule, at least in dolus eventualis cases, invalidates 
the principle in Shezi.
206
 Nestadt JA asserted that, due to the different means employed by the 
first appellant, his actions fell outside the scope of the common purpose. The imputation of 
the first appellant’s action to the second appellant amounts to an application of the versari in 
re illicita doctrine.
207
 Therefore, the AD did not convict the second appellant for assault. 
Despite the AD’s development of the Goosen-rule in common purpose cases, as well as 
Burchell’s exposure of the defence limiting liability under the doctrine, in a number of 
common purpose cases where the defence provided by the Goosen-rule was fitting, courts 
have overlooked the defence.  
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 the second appellant assaulted the deceased and then, with the first appellant’s 
help, threw the deceased’s body into the sea. The evidence did not establish which was the 
cause of the death, namely the assault or the drowning. Furthermore, there was no evidence 
suggesting whether the second appellant intended to kill the deceased by assaulting or 
drowning him. The majority, per Nestadt JA, who delivered an exemplary judgment of the 
application of the Goosen-rule one year earlier in Mitchell, failed to consider the second 
appellant’s mistake as to the causal sequence.
209
 Nestadt JA, in assuming that the deceased 
was no longer alive when he was thrown into the bay, held that the second appellant must 
have foreseen that the deceased might die as a result of the assault.
210
 Furthermore, Nestadt 
JA asserts “the same, of course, applies if the deceased was still alive when he was thrown 
into the water.”
211
 However, if the court had considered the Goosen-rule and the application 
thereof in Mitchell, the court’s conclusion may have differed.  
Arguably, the second appellant could have foreseen that death would result from the assault, 
whilst death from the drowning was not foreseen. Alternatively, the second appellant could 
have foreseen that death would result from drowning, whilst death resulting from the assault 
was not foreseen. However, there was no evidence suggesting the cause of the death and 
whether the second appellant intended to kill the deceased by assaulting or drowning him. It 
is submitted that in the event the court considered the Goosen-rule, the evidence would have 
suggested one of the possible causal sequences. In the event that the cause of death and the 
second appellant’s foresight of the causal sequence did not correlate, the second appellant 
would have been found innocent of murder. Similarly, in Lungile,
212
 Olivier JA ignored the 
Goosen-rule as a defence of dolus on the part of the first appellant.
213
  
The cases of Safatsa, Nzo and Thebus are further instances where the application of the 
Goosen-rule was suitable, but ignored by the courts. The SCA’s judgment in Molimi
214
 
provides a noteworthy caution in favour of a proper application of the Goosen-rule in 
common purpose cases, whereby Cachalia AJA held: 
The common purpose doctrine does not require each participant to know or foresee every 
detail of the way in which the unlawful result is brought about. But neither does it require 
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each participant to anticipate every unlawful act in which each of the participants may 
conceivably engage in pursuit of the objectives of the common purpose.
215
 
However, despite the development of the Goosen-rule in common purpose cases serving as a 
welcome limitation of the liability under the doctrine, courts and defence lawyers alike have 
failed to apply the Goosen-rule in common purpose cases. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
defence is reduced to a benefit of competent judges and lawyers.  
3.5.3 Mistake of Law 
Professor Grant introduces another possible defence to liability under the doctrine of common 
purpose. He argues that the defence recognised in De Blom
216
 may serve as a limit on the 
liability in common purpose cases.
217
 From the outset, it must be noted that the defence 
recognised in De Blom has never been raised in a common purpose case. This chapter 
presents a defence of mistake of law that may theoretically be raised in common purpose 
cases.   
Ignorantia juris non excusat was a rule of South African law, meaning knowledge of 
unlawfulness is not an element of intention.
218
 The judgment in De Blom eradicated the rule, 
holding that an accused’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct is a requirement of 
mens rea.
219
 Accordingly, mistake of law serves as a defence, excluding criminal liability.
220
 
Where a crime requires intention, an accused’s mistake of law is determined subjectively, 
whereas an offence necessitating negligence is objectively determined, requiring an accused’s 
mistake of law to be genuine and reasonable.
221
 The success of the defence depends on 
whether an accused’s mistake of law is essential and genuine.
222
 A genuine mistake of law 
necessitates the accused’s ignorance or mistaken belief to be bona fide, whilst an essential 
mistake of law pertains to an essential element of the crime, being unlawfulness.
223
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Grant argues that “the attribution of conduct under the doctrine of common purpose is a 
function and question of law. A mistake regarding its legal function is a mistake of law, and, 
depending on the form of fault, may lead to a complete acquittal”.
224
 An accused participant 
charged with murder under common purpose may argue that he did not know or foresee that, 
as a function of law, the conduct of the principal perpetrator would be imputed to him.
225
 
Alternatively, an accused participant charged with culpable homicide under common purpose 
may argue that his mistake regarding the imputation of causation from the principal 
perpetrator to himself was reasonable.
226
  
Grant concludes that “it does not seem a stretch to argue that if an accused did not know the 
effect of common purpose, then s/he may raise the defence of lack of fault. Thus, it seems, 
that on a proper application of the defence of mistake of law alone, the Marikana miners 
ought not to be convicted under common purpose”.
227
 However, Grant failed to consider the 
AD’s judgment in Hlomza,
228
 whereby the meaning of ‘unlawfulness’ under the defence of 
knowledge of unlawfulness was clarified. In Hlomza, the AD noted that the accused does not 
have to know the detailed requirements of the crime, the provisions of the applicable law, or 
the specific penalty attached to the crime.
229
 The accused must merely know that the conduct 
is contrary to law in the broad sense.
230
 It is uncertain how the AD’s judgment would pertain 
to common purpose cases, as the conduct may refer to joining the common purpose, the 
participant’s specific contribution, or the conduct that results in the ultimate unlawful 
consequence. Nevertheless, on any aforementioned approach, the defence necessitates 
recognition of the principle of culpability and fair labelling, whereby Milton’s commentary 
on the effect of De Blom bears repeating: 
These decisions have one common philosophical basis: that punishment is only properly 
inflicted when it is deserved; that desert follows from individual blameworthiness; that 
blameworthiness is a function of decisions made with a mature free will and a conscious 
awareness of wrong doing. One who because of ignorance does not know that he is 
transgressing the law…is not blameworthy and thus ought not to be punished.
231
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The wide liability accrued under common purpose demands limitation. The defence of 
mistake as to the causal sequence may serve this demand, but the reality of the court’s 
disregard of the defence renders this limitation meaningless. The application of the defence of 
mistake of law in common purpose cases is a plausible defence. However, given the fact that 
the Goosen-rule is continuously ignored in common purpose cases, it hardly seems likely that 
the defence of mistake of law will be recognised and applied as a possible defence to limit 
liability under the doctrine. The defences of mistake as to the causal sequence and mistake of 
law seemingly realise the necessity of limiting liability under common purpose, but the 
associated problems frustrate the achievement of curtailing a doctrine that sacrifices legal 





















The doctrine of common purpose contradicts a number of criminal law principles. This 
chapter has shown that the requirement of ‘active association’ and the defence of dissociation 
violate the ius certum principle, as both the requirement and the defence are inherently vague. 
Furthermore, upon scrutinising the normative justifications for the imputation of causation 
proffered by the courts, it appears that the justifications are assailable for a number of 
reasons. The problems associated with the assessment of fault in common purpose cases has 
been exposed, noting the revival of the versari doctrine, the violation of the contemporaneity 
rule, as well as the court’s improper inferential reasoning. The ineffective value of the 
defences of mistake as to the causal sequence and mistake of law as a means to curtail the 
wide liability accrued under common purpose has also been identified. The subsequent 
chapter serves as a conclusion to this thesis, whereby a discussion on the reformation of the 









A detailed theory of reforming the common purpose doctrine is beyond the scope this thesis. 
Nevertheless, this chapter will discuss the major recommendations for reform. The 
recommendations may be categorised into three schools of thought, namely (i) complete 
retention of the current doctrine; (ii) partial reform in terms of Walker’s substantial 
contribution theory
1
 and; (iii) abolition and replacement of the doctrine. This chapter analyses 
each school of thought with reference to the constitutional and principled findings in this 
thesis. The chapter closes with the writer’s recommendation.  
 
4.2 THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
 
4.2.1 Complete retention 
The retention of common purpose stems from the arguments presented by Moseneke J and 
Snyman. In Thebus, Moseneke J held that common purpose, in its active association form, 
does not need to be developed as commanded by s 39(2) of the Constitution.
2
 His arguments 
were premised on the doctrine’s necessary existence to achieve crime control.
3
 Snyman 
welcomed the Constitutional Court’s (hereinafter CC) judgment in Thebus, although basing 
his support for the retention of the doctrine on alternative grounds, namely overcoming the 
difficulty or impossibility of proving the element of causation.
4
 Snyman’s call for complete 
retention of the doctrine is predicated on the CC’s endorsement in Thebus. However, given 
the findings of this thesis, specifically the unconstitutionality of the doctrine
5
 and the 
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violation of a number of criminal law principles,
6
 the call for complete retention cannot 
validly be maintained.   
The current application of the doctrine thus necessitates some form of reform that respects a 
participant’s constitutional rights and the principles of criminal law. Walker has provided 
recommendations for reforming common purpose, aimed at addressing the doctrine’s 
constitutional and principled violations.
7
  
4.2.2 Substantial contribution theory 
Walker advocates for the partial reform of common purpose, guided by the principles of 
culpability and fair labelling.
8
 Her recommendations are largely based on Dressler’s theory of 
reforming American complicity law.
9
 Walker submits that the liability of a co-perpetrator 
under common purpose should be earmarked for instances where the participant’s conduct is 
sufficient to render the participant as an ‘indirect’ perpetrator, thus according with the maxim 
qui facit per alium facit per se.
10
 Walker argues that the requirements for association
11
 should 
not constitute a sufficient requirement for liability as a co-perpetrator.
12
 Instead, in order for 
the participant to be regarded as an ‘indirect’ perpetrator, liability should arise from a 
participant’s association plus a substantial contribution to the conception, planning or 
execution of the crime.
13
 Walker recommends that only the following secondary participants 
should be deemed co-perpetrators under the doctrine:
14
  
(a) A conspirator who also instigates (procures or otherwise authorises) the commission 
of the crime by the actual perpetrator;
15
 
(b) A conspirator who also plays a substantial role in the conception and/or planning of 
the crime; 
(c) A party to a common purpose, whether formed by conspiracy or active association, 
who also plays a substantial role in the execution of the crime.
16
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A secondary participant that does not fall within one of the above categories would be liable 
as an accomplice. Walker submits that the present law of accomplice liability does not 
require reform, but rather a clarification on the nature of the casual relationship between the 
conduct of the accomplice and the commission of the crime by the actual perpetrator.
17
 She 
argues that the causal nexus be determined by the accomplice’s conduct “facilitating the 
commission of the crime in some way (that is to say, makes it easier, more expeditious, or 
more convenient for the actual perpetrator to commit the crime), even if the crime could and 
probably would have been committed without the accomplice’s contribution”.
18
 The 
individuals, who do not satisfy the definition of the reformed category of co-perpetrators or 
qualify as an accomplice, will be liable for alternative convictions.
19
  
Walker argues that on her theory, no legitimate objection to the imputation of the principal 
perpetrator’s conduct to the secondary participant can be levelled.
20
 She submits that a 
participant’s liability being based on considerations other than causation, namely substantial 
contribution in the conception, planning or execution of the crime, overcomes the 
constitutional and principled violations of the doctrine.
21
 In other words, as the criticism 
levelled against the doctrine is primarily rooted in the imputation of causation, a theory that is 
based on an alternative approach to causation will be devoid of such criticism. However, 
Walker’ reformist theory is assailable for a number of constitutional and principled reasons.
22
      
First, Walker acknowledges that the doctrine, in its present form infringes the accused’s 
presumption of innocence, as it relieves the prosecution of having to prove the element of 
causation in relation to a participant in a common purpose.
23
 Walker’s theory, which 
necessitates an association plus a substantial contribution, merely addresses her submission 
that the prosecution is relieved from proving the extent of the participant’s contribution to the 
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 On her reformed theory of common purpose, the derogation of the casual 
nexus still exists, thus the prosecution remains relieved of having to prove a necessary 
element of a consequence crime and the participant continues to be deprived of viable 
defences that exclude causation.
25
 The doctrine unfairly discriminates between a participant 
in a common purpose and both the principal perpetrator and a person charged of committing 
a consequence crime but not engaged in a common purpose,
26
 Walker’s theory disregards this 
significant claim of unfair discrimination. Additionally, even on Walker’s theory, a 
participant’s right to freedom and security of person is infringed, as the threshold test set in 
De Lange v Smuts
27
 fails. The threshold test necessitates a proportionality assessment, similar 
to that which a court performs under a s 36 limitation analysis. Accordingly, the availability 




On Walker’s theory, the infringement of the aforementioned rights is sufficient to pass the 
threshold enquiry stage and necessitate a justification under s 36 of the Constitution.
29
 A 
limitation analysis, adopting the Kantian approach to the interpretation of rights,
30
 with an 
emphasis on the availability of less restrictive means, specifically liability as an accomplice, 
would certainly render the limitation unreasonable and unjustifiable.
31
  
This paper has found that the concept of ‘active association’ is inherently vague, thus 
violating the ius certum principle.
32
 Walker’s theory seeks to base liability on association, 
which includes the requirements of prior agreement and active association, plus a substantial 
contribution. Walker’s undefined concept of ‘substantial contribution’ is equally as vague as 
the concept of ‘active association’. The vagueness of the concept of ‘active association’, plus 
the vagueness of the concept of ‘substantial contribution’ will increase the courts’ freedom to 
interpret a case with hindsight directed at crime control.
33
 Lastly, Walker has failed to 
consider the problems associated with the assessment of fault in common purpose cases.
34
 
Thus, even on her reformed theory, the doctrine revives the versari in re illicita doctrine and 
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violates the contemporaneity rule.
35
 Furthermore, the theory does not address the courts 
improper inferential reasoning in establishing dolus eventualis in common purpose cases.
36
  
Walker’s theory, although arguably addressing a participant’s constitutional concerns related 
to dignity,
37
 such as the principles of culpability, proportionality and fair labelling, fails to 
address a number of issues raised above. Her finding regarding the unconstitutionality of the 
present doctrine is correct, and a result of such finding, specifically the existence of less 
intrusive means, is perhaps the only reformist approach capable of addressing the 
constitutional and principled shortcomings of the present doctrine.  
4.2.3 Abolition and replacement 
Burchell calls for the eradication of the doctrine of common purpose, with the substitution of 
less intrusive means of punishing persons involved in joint criminal activity, such as 
convictions for lesser crimes and liability as an accomplice.
38
 He criticises Moseneke J’s 
reliance on the English joint enterprise rule as support for South Africa’s doctrine of common 
purpose. His criticism is based on the fact that English law does not deem participants in a 
joint enterprise as co-perpetrators through the imputation of liability, but rather deems 
participants as accomplices. Burchell submits that replacing common purpose with 
accomplice liability would allow the court to give appropriate weight to the extent of a 
participant’s participation in a common purpose in determining the verdict and sentence.
39
  
Joubert JA in Williams
40
 defined an accomplice as a person who, lacking the actus reus of the 
perpetrator and can thus not be regarded as a perpetrator or co-perpetrator:  
[A]ssociates himself wittingly with the commission of the crime… in that he knowingly 
affords the perpetrator or co-perpetrator the opportunity, the means or the information which 
furthers the commission of the crime… The assistances consciously rendered by the 
accomplice in the commission of the crime can consist of an act or an omission… [T]here 
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must be a causal connection between the accomplice’s assistance and the commission of the 





 Botha AJA’s dissenting judgment affirmed the causal connection requirement for 
accomplice liability proffered by Joubert JA in Williams. However, neither Joubert JA nor 
Botha AJA articulated the degree of the causal connection required. Burchell submits that 
“only factual causation in the sense of ‘furthering’ or ‘assisting’ in the commission of the 
crime is necessary for accomplice liability”, thereby confining an assessment of legal 
causation to perpetrator liability.
43
 Burchell’s approach to accomplice liability, specifically 
the assessment of causation, raises strong constitutional challenges.  
First, an accomplice’s right to be presumed innocent is infringed, as the prosecution is 
relieved of having to prove the necessary element of causation in consequence crimes, 
specifically the requisite legal causation element.
44
 An accomplice’s presumption of 
innocence is also infringed through the unavailable viable defences excluding causation.
45
 
Burchell’s unfair discrimination criticism leveled against common purpose is equally 
applicable to accomplice liability, as an accomplice is treated unequally in contrast to a 
perpetrator or co-perpetrator.
46
 It is thus evident that the recommendation provided by 
Burchell is also plagued by constitutional incongruence.  
 
4.3 THE WRITER’S RECOMMENDATION 
The findings of this thesis necessitate the abolition of the doctrine of common purpose by 
prior agreement and in its active association form. The recommendations captured by the 
three schools of thought fail to ensure that the doctrine complies with the Constitution and 
adheres to criminal law principles. Burchell’s call for the abolition and replacement of the 
doctrine hints at the only viable recommendation. Convictions for lesser crimes
47
 and liability 
as an accomplice is the correct approach. However, before the constitutional and principled 
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criticism leveled against the doctrine of common purpose is not equally applicable to 
accomplice liability; two developments are required. The first development pertains to the 
law related to accomplice liability, and the second pertains to a policy consideration. 
Accomplice liability requires a causal connection between the accomplice’s assistance and 
the commission of the crime by the perpetrator. This causal connection should entail an 
assessment of both factual and legal causation. Such an approach would address the 
abovementioned constitutional challenge leveled against Burchell’s theory of accomplice 
liability. The second development necessitates a discussion of the punishment of 
accomplices.  
The principle of proportionality reflects the relationship between the severity of the crime and 
the sentence imposed.
48
 In determining the seriousness of the crime, a number of aggravating 
and mitigating factors are assessed. One relevant factor is the culpability of the offender.
49
 
Burchell submits that “the appropriate sentence to impose on an accomplice will depend on 
the extent of the accomplice’s participation in the crime”.
50
 However, Terblanche argues that 
the exact weight attached to the mitigating factor of an accused’s degree of involvement in 
the commission of the crime, in contrast to other mitigating and aggravating factors remains 
unknown.
51
 The South African Law Commission Report has proposed a principled approach 
to determining the seriousness of a crime, which prioritises the principle of proportionality:
52
  
It is desirable that punishment in the first instance must be proportionate to the seriousness of 
the offence so that offenders can get their just deserts. The seriousness of the offence depends 
in turn on the harm caused by the offence and the culpability of the offender in respect of the 
offence. A focus on harm and culpability will enable a court to impose adequately severe 
sentences.
53 
The Report seeks to position the offence as the main focus of the sentencing decision, as 
opposed to society’s interests of punishment.
54
 However, the proposal has not yet been 
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accepted. Only on the acceptance of the proposal can an accomplice’s right to dignity be 
respected, as the principles of culpability, proportionality and fair labeling are satisfied. 
It is submitted that the doctrine of common purpose must be abolished from South African 
law, and replaced with convictions for lesser crimes and liability as an accomplice. The 
causal connection required under accomplice liability must comprise of both factual and legal 
causation. Furthermore, the sentencing report must be accepted, so as to adequately reflect 
the extent of an accomplice’s participation in determining the sentence. This overall approach 
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